Yom Kippur War

The Yom Kippur War, Ramadan War or October War (Hebrew: ????? ??? ????????; transliterated: Milhemet Yom HaKipurim; Arabic: ??? ??????; transliterated: Harb October or ??? ????? transliterated: Harb Tishrin), also known as the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, was fought from October 6 (the day of Yom Kippur) to October 24, 1973, between Israel and a coalition of Egypt and Syria. The War began when Egypt and Syria launched a surprise joint attack (though recent evidence suggests that some key figures in Israel were aware of it ahead of time) in the Sinai and Golan Heights, respectively, both of which had been captured by Israel during the Six-Day War six years earlier.

The cease-fire and immediate aftermath

Egypt's trapped Third Army

The United Nations passed a cease-fire, largely negotiated between the U.S. and Soviet Union, on October 22. It called for an end to the fighting between Israel and Egypt (but technically not between Syria and Israel). It came into effect 12 hours later at 6:52 PM Israeli time. (Rabinovich, 452). Because it went into effect after darkness, it was impossible for satellite surveillance to determine where the front lines were when the fighting was supposed to stop. (Rabinovich, 458)

Related Topics:
October 22 - Satellite - Surveillance

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When the cease-fire began, the Israeli forces were just a few hundred meters short of their goal—the last road linking Cairo and Suez. During the night, the Egyptians broke the cease-fire in a number of locations, destroying nine Israeli tanks. In response, David Elazar requested permission to resume the drive south, and Moshe Dayan approved. (Rabinovich, 463) The Israeli troops finished the drive south, captured the road, and trapped the Egyptian Third Army west of the Suez Canal.

Related Topics:
Cairo - Suez

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The next morning, October 23, a flurry of diplomatic activity occurred. Soviet reconnaissance flights had confirmed that Israeli forces were moving south, and the Soviets accused the Israelis of treachery. In a phone call with Golda Meir, Henry Kissinger asked, "how can anyone ever know where a line is or was in the desert?" Meir responded, "they'll know, all right." Kissinger found out shortly later about the trapped Egyptian army. (Rabinovich, 465).

Related Topics:
October 23 - Diplomat - Reconnaissance flights

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Kissinger realized the situation presented the United States with a tremendous opportunity—Egypt was totally dependent on the United States to prevent Israel from destroying its trapped army, which now had no access to food or water. The position could be parlayed later into allowing the United States to mediate the dispute, and push Egypt out of Soviet influences.

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:" had pushed Israel during the war to strike hard—harder, in fact, than it had initially been able to—in order to demonstrate its military superiority. But once the Israelis had begun smiting the Egyptians, he worked towards a speedy cease-fire that would leave the Egyptians with their dignity intact. Israel, in short, was to emerge quasi-victorious, not triumphant" (Rabinovich, 486)

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As a result, the United States exerted tremendous pressure on the Israelis to refrain from destroying the trapped army, even threatening to support a UN resolution to force the Israelis to pull back to their October 22 positions if they did not allow non-military supplies to reach the army. In a phone call with Israeli ambassador Simcha Dinitz, Kissinger told the ambassador that the destruction of the Egyptian Third Army "is an option that does not exist" (Rabinovich, 487).

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Nuclear alert

In the meantime, Brezhnev sent Nixon a letter in the middle of the night of October 23–24. In that letter, Brezhnev proposed that American and Soviet contingents be dispatched to ensure both sides honor the cease-fire. He also threatened that "I will say it straight that if you find it impossible to act jointly with us in this matter, we should be faced with the necessity urgently to consider taking appropriate steps unilaterally. We cannot allow arbitrariness on the part of Israel" (Rabinovich, 479). In short, the Soviets were threatening to intervene in the war on Egypt's side.

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The message arrived after Nixon had gone to bed. Kissinger immediately called a meeting of senior officials, including Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, CIA Director William Colby, and White House Chief of Staff Alexander Haig. The Watergate scandal had reached its apex, and Nixon was so agitated and discomposed that they decided to handle the matter without him:

Related Topics:
Defense Secretary - James Schlesinger - CIA Director - William Colby - White House Chief of Staff - Alexander Haig - Watergate scandal

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:"When Kissinger asked Haig whether should be wakened, the White House chief of staff replied firmly 'No.' Haig clearly shared Kissinger's feelings that Nixon was in no shape to make weighty decisions" (Rabinovich, 480).

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The meeting produced a conciliatory response, which was sent (in Nixon's name) to Brezhnev. At the same time, it was decided to increase the Defense Condition (DEFCON) from four to three, the highest peacetime level. Lastly, they approved a message to Sadat (again, in Nixon's name) asking him to drop his request for Soviet assistance, and threatening that if the Soviets were to intervene, so would the United States. (Rabinovich, 480)

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The Soviets quickly detected the increased American defense condition, and were astonished and bewildered at the response. "Who could have imagined the Americans would be so easily frightened," said Nikolai Podgorny. "It is not reasonable to become engaged in a war with the United States because of Egypt and Syria," said KGB chief Alexei Kosygin, while Yuri Andropov added that "We shall not unleash the Third World War" (Rabinovich, 484). In the end, the Soviets reconciled themselves to an Arab defeat. The letter from the American cabinet arrived during the meeting. Brezhnev decided that the Americans were too nervous, and that the best course of action would be to wait to reply. (Rabinovich, 485) The next morning, the Egyptians agreed to the American suggestion, and dropped their request for assistance from the Soviets, bringing the crisis to an end.

Related Topics:
Nikolai Podgorny - Alexei Kosygin - Yuri Andropov - Third World War

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Northern front de-escalation

On the northern front, the Syrians had been preparing for a massive counter-attack, scheduled for October 23. In addition to Syria's five divisions, Iraq had supplied two, and there were smaller complements of troops from other Arab countries, including Jordan. The Soviets had replaced most of the losses Syria's tank forces had suffered during the first weeks of the war.

Related Topics:
October 23 - Division - Iraq

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However, the day before the offensive was to begin, the United Nations imposed its cease-fire (following the acquiescence of both Israel and Egypt). "The acceptance by Egypt of the cease-fire on Monday created a major dilemma for Assad. The cease-fire did not bind him, but its implications could not be ignored. Some on the Syrian General Staff favored going ahead with the attack, arguing that if it did so Egypt would feel obliged to continue fighting as well... Others, however, argued that continuation of the war would legitimize Israel's efforts to destroy the Egyptian Third Army. In that case, Egypt would not come to Syria's assistance when Israel turned its full might northward, destroying Syria's infrastructure and perhaps attacking Damascus" (Rabinovich, 464-465)

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Ultimately, Assad decided to call off the offensive, and on October 23, Syria announced it had accepted the cease-fire, and the Iraqi government ordered its forces home.

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Post-cease-fire negotiations

Organized fighting on all fronts ended by October 26. The cease-fire did not end the sporadic clashes along the cease-fire lines, nor did it dissipate military tensions. With the third Army cut off and without any means of resupply, it was effectively a hostage to the Israelis.

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Israel received Kissinger's threat to support a UN withdrawal resolution, but before they could respond, Egyptian national security advisor Hafez Ismail sent Kissinger a stunning message—Egypt was willing to enter into direct talks with the Israelis, provided that the Israelis agree to allow nonmilitary supplies to reach their army and agree to a complete cease-fire.

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The talks took place on October 28, between Israeli Major General Aharon Yariv and Egyptian Major General Muhammad al-Ghani al-Gamasy. Ultimately, Kissinger brought the proposal to Sadat, who agreed almost without debate. United Nations checkpoints were brought in to replace Israeli checkpoints, nonmilitary supplies were allowed to pass, and prisoners-of-war were to be exchanged. A summit in Geneva followed, and ultimately, a peace agreement was worked out. On January 18, Israel signed a pullback agreement to the west side of the canal, and the last of their troops withdrew on March 5, 1974 (Rabinovich, 493).

Related Topics:
Aharon Yariv - Muhammad al-Ghani al-Gamasy - Prisoners-of-war - Geneva - March 5 - 1974

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Shuttle diplomacy by Henry Kissinger eventually produced a disengagement agreement on May 31, 1974, based on exchange of prisoners-of-war, Israeli withdrawal to the Purple Line and the establishment of a UN buffer zone. The UN Disengagement and Observer Force (UNDOF) was established as a peacekeeping force in the Golan.

Related Topics:
Shuttle diplomacy - May 31 - 1974 - Purple Line - UN Disengagement and Observer Force

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