Yom Kippur War

The Yom Kippur War, Ramadan War or October War (Hebrew: ????? ??? ????????; transliterated: Milhemet Yom HaKipurim; Arabic: ??? ??????; transliterated: Harb October or ??? ????? transliterated: Harb Tishrin), also known as the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, was fought from October 6 (the day of Yom Kippur) to October 24, 1973, between Israel and a coalition of Egypt and Syria. The War began when Egypt and Syria launched a surprise joint attack (though recent evidence suggests that some key figures in Israel were aware of it ahead of time) in the Sinai and Golan Heights, respectively, both of which had been captured by Israel during the Six-Day War six years earlier.

Long-term effects of the war

The peace discussion at the end of the war was the first time that Arab and Israeli officials met for direct public discussions since the aftermath of the 1948 war.

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

For the Arabs (and Egyptians in particular), the psychological trauma of their defeat in the Six-Day War had been healed. In many ways, it allowed them to negotiate with the Israelis as equals. However, given that the war had started about as well as the Arabs could have wanted but at the end they only made limited territorial gains in the Sinai front, while Israel gained more territory on the Golan Heights than it held before the war and also managed to gain a foothold on African soil east of the canal helped convince many in the Arab world that it could not be defeated militarily, thereby strengthening peace movements.

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

The war had a stunning effect on the population in Israel. Following their victory in the Six-Day War, the Israeli military had become complacent. The shock and sudden defeats that occurred at the beginning of the war sent a terrible psychological blow to the Israelis, who had thought they had military supremacy in the region.(Rabinovich, 497–498) However, in time, they began to realize that "Reeling from a surprise attack on two fronts with the bulk of its army still unmobilized, and confronted by staggering new battlefield realities, Israel's situation was one that could readily bring strong nations to their knees. Yet, within days, it had regained its footing and within less than two weeks it was threatening both enemy capitals", "an achievement having few historical parallels." (Rabinovich, 498). However, in Israel, the casualty rate was high. Per capita, Israel suffered as many casualties in 3 weeks of fighting as the United States did during almost a decade of fighting in Vietnam.

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

In response to U.S. support of Israel, OAPEC nations, the Arab members of OPEC, led by Saudi Arabia, decided to reduce oil production by 5% per month on October 17, and threatened an embargo. President Nixon then appealed to Congress on October 18th for $2.2 billion for arms shipments to Israel. On October 20th, in the midst of the war, Saudi Arabia declared an embargo against the United States, later joined by other oil exporters and extended against the Netherlands and other states, causing the 1973 energy crisis.

Related Topics:
OAPEC - OPEC - Saudi Arabia - Oil - October 17 - Netherlands - 1973 energy crisis

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

Any hope among the Egyptian government that this war would distract the Egyptian population from internal grievances, were nullified by a massive destructive anti-government food riot in Cairo with the slogan "Y? batl al-`ab?r, f?n al-fut?r?" ("Hero of the crossing, where is our breakfast?").

Related Topics:
Riot - Cairo

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

Fallout in Israel

A protest against the Israeli government started four months after the war ended. It was led by Moti Ashkenazi, commander of Budapest, the northernmost of the Bar-Lev forts and the only one during the war not to be captured by the Egyptians (Rabinovich, 499). Anger against the Israeli government (and Dayan in particular) was high. Shimon Agranat, President of the Israeli Supreme Court, was asked to lead an inquiry, the Agranat Commission, into the events leading up to the war and the setbacks of the first few days (Rabinovich, 501).

Related Topics:
Moti Ashkenazi - Shimon Agranat - Israeli Supreme Court - Inquiry - Agranat Commission

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

The Agranat Commission published its preliminary findings on April 2, 1974. Six people were held particularly responsible for Israel's failings:

Related Topics:
Agranat Commission - April 2 - 1974

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

• IDF Chief of Staff David Elazar was recommended for dismissal, after the Commission found he bore "personal responsibility for the assessment of the situation and the preparedness of the IDF."
• Chief of Intelligence Eli Zeira and his deputy, Aryeh Shalev, were recommended for dismissal.
• Lt. Colonel Bandman, head of the Aman desk for Egypt, and Lt. Colonel Gedelia, chief of intelligence for the Southern Command, were recommended for transfer away from intelligence duties.
• Shmuel Gonen, commander of the Southern front, was recommended by the initial report to be relieved of active duty (Rabinovich, 502). He was forced to leave the army after the publication of the Commission's final report, on January 30, 1975, which found that "he failed to fulfill his duties adequately, and bears much of the responsibility for the dangerous situation in which our troops were caught."{{ref|Agranat}}

Rather than quieting public discontent, the report—which "had stressed that it was judging the ministers' responsibility for security failings, not their parliamentary responsibility, which fell outside its mandate"—inflamed it. Although it had cleared Meir and Dayan of all responsibility, public calls for their resignation (especially Dayan's) became more vociferous. (Rabinovich, 502)

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

Finally, on April 11, 1974, Golda Meir resigned. Her cabinet followed suit, including Dayan, who had previously offered to resign twice and was turned down both times by Meir. Yitzhak Rabin, who had spent most of the war as an advisor to Elazar in an unofficial capacity (Rabinovich, 237), became head of the new Government, which was seated in June.

Related Topics:
April 11 - 1974 - Yitzhak Rabin

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

Camp David Accords

:Main article - Camp David Accords (1978)

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

Rabin's government was hamstrung by a pair of scandals, and he was forced to step down in 1977. The right-wing Likud party, under the prime ministership of Menachem Begin, won the elections that followed. This was a historic change in the Israeli political landscape since for the first time since Israel's founding, a coalition not led by the labour party was in control of the government.

Related Topics:
1977 - Right-wing - Likud - Menachem Begin - Labour party

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

Sadat, who had entered the war in order to recover the Sinai, grew frustrated at the slow pace of the peace process. In November 1977, he took the unprecedented step of visiting Israel, becoming the first Arab leader to do so (and implicitly recognizing Israel's right to exist).

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

The act jump-started the peace process. United States President Jimmy Carter invited both Sadat and Begin to a summit at Camp David to negotiate a final peace. The talks took place from September 5–17, 1978. Ultimately, the talks succeeded, and Israel and Egypt signed the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty in 1979. Israel withdrew its troops and settlers from the Sinai, in exchange for normal relations with Egypt and a lasting peace.

Related Topics:
Jimmy Carter - Camp David - 1978 - Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty - 1979

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

Many in the Arab community were outraged at Egypt's peace with Israel. Egypt was expelled from the Arab League. Until then, Egypt had been "at the helm of the Arab world" (Karsh, 86).

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

Anwar Sadat was assassinated two years later, on October 6, 1981, while attending a parade marking the eighth anniversary of the start of the war. He was assassinated by Army members who were outraged at his negotiations with Israel.

Related Topics:
October 6 - 1981

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~