Yom Kippur War

The Yom Kippur War, Ramadan War or October War (Hebrew: ????? ??? ????????; transliterated: Milhemet Yom HaKipurim; Arabic: ??? ??????; transliterated: Harb October or ??? ????? transliterated: Harb Tishrin), also known as the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, was fought from October 6 (the day of Yom Kippur) to October 24, 1973, between Israel and a coalition of Egypt and Syria. The War began when Egypt and Syria launched a surprise joint attack (though recent evidence suggests that some key figures in Israel were aware of it ahead of time) in the Sinai and Golan Heights, respectively, both of which had been captured by Israel during the Six-Day War six years earlier.

Background

Causes

This war was part of the Arab-Israeli conflict, a conflict which has included many battles and wars since 1948. During the Six-Day War six years earlier, the Israelis had captured the Sinai clear to the Suez Canal, which had become the cease-fire line. The Israelis had also captured roughly half of the Golan Heights from Syria.

Related Topics:
Arab-Israeli conflict - 1948 - Six-Day War - Suez Canal

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In the years following that war, Israel erected lines of fortification in both the Sinai and the Golan Heights. In 1971 Israel spent $500 million fortifying its positions on the Suez Canal, a chain of fortifications and gigantic earthworks known as the Bar Lev Line, named after Israeli General Haim Bar-Lev. After the war that defeated the Egyptian and Syrian armies in 1967, and having emerged undefeated from the three-year-long War of Attrition with Egypt in the south and several border incidents with Syria in the north, the Israeli leadership had grown somewhat complacent.

Related Topics:
1971 - Bar Lev Line - Haim Bar-Lev - 1967 - War of Attrition

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Both Arab countries desired a return of the territories lost in the 1967 war. After the success of the Six-Day War the Israeli leadership was reluctant to enter into negotiations over returning these territories, feeling that they were militarily secure. President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt died in September 1970. He was succeeded by Anwar Sadat, who resolved to fight Israel and win back the territory lost in the Six-Day War. In 1971, Sadat, in response to an initiative by UN intermediary Gunnar Jarring, declared that if Israel committed itself to "withdrawal of its armed forces from Sinai and the Gaza Strip" and to implementation of other provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 242 as requested by Jarring, Egypt would then "be ready to enter into a peace agreement with Israel." Israel responded that it would not withdraw to the pre-June 5, 1967, lines.{{ref|response}}

Related Topics:
Gamal Abdel Nasser - 1970 - Anwar Sadat - 1971 - Gunnar Jarring - Gaza Strip - UN Security Council Resolution 242

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Sadat hoped that by inflicting even a limited defeat on the Israelis, the status quo could be altered. Hafiz al-Assad, the head of Syria, had a different view. He had little interest in negotiation and felt the retaking of the Golan Heights would be a purely military option. Since the Six-Day War, Assad had launched a massive military build up and hoped to make Syria the dominant military power of the Arab states. With the aid of Egypt, Assad felt that his new army could win convincingly against the Israeli army and thus secure Syria's role in the region. Assad only saw negotiations beginning once the Golan Heights had been retaken by force, which would induce Israel to give up the West Bank and Gaza, and make other concessions.

Related Topics:
Hafiz al-Assad - West Bank - Gaza

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Sadat also had important domestic concerns in wanting war. "The three years since Sadat had taken office... were the most demoralized in Egyptian history... A desiccated economy added to the nation's despondency. War was a desperate option." (Rabinovich, 13). In his biography of Sadat, Raphael Israeli argued that Sadat felt the root of the problem was in the great shame over the Six-Day War, and before any reforms could be introduced he felt that shame had to be overcome. Egypt's economy was in shambles, but Sadat knew that the deep reforms that he felt were needed would be deeply unpopular among parts of the population. A military victory would give him the popularity he needed to make changes. A portion of the Egyptian population, most prominently university students who launched wide protests, strongly desired a war to reclaim the Sinai and were highly upset that Sadat had not launched one in his first three years in office.

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The other Arab states showed much more reluctance to fully commit to a new war. King Hussein of Jordan feared another major loss of territory as had occurred in the Six-Day War, during which Jordan was halved in population. Sadat was also backing the claim of the PLO to the territories (West Bank and Gaza) and in the event of a victory promised Yasser Arafat that he would be given control of them. Hussein still saw the West Bank as part of Jordan and wanted it restored to his kingdom. Moreover, during the Black September crisis of 1970 a near civil war had broken out between the PLO and the Jordanian government. In that war Syria had intervened militarily on the side of the PLO, leaving Assad and Hussein estranged.

Related Topics:
King Hussein - Jordan - PLO - West Bank - Gaza - Yasser Arafat - Black September crisis - 1970

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Iraq and Syria also had strained relations, and the Iraqis refused to join the initial offensive. Lebanon, which shared a border with Israel, was not expected to join the Arab war effort due to its small army and already evident instability. The months before the war saw Sadat engage in a diplomatic offensive to try to win support for the war. By the fall of 1973 he claimed the backing of more than a hundred states. These were most of the countries of the Arab League, Non-Aligned Movement, and Organization of African Unity. Sadat had also worked to curry favour in Europe and had some success before the war. Britain and France had for the first time sided with the Arab powers against Israel on the United Nations Security Council. In the lead up to the war West Germany became one of Egypt's largest sources of materiel.

Related Topics:
Lebanon - Arab League - Non-Aligned Movement - Organization of African Unity - United Nations Security Council - West Germany

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Events leading up to the War

Anwar Sadat in 1972 publicly stated that Egypt was committed to going to war with Israel, and that they were prepared to "sacrifice one million Egyptian soldiers." From the end of 1972, Egypt began a concentrated effort to build up its forces, receiving MiG-23s, SA-6s, RPG-7s and especially the AT-3 Sagger anti-tank guided missile from the Soviet Union and improving its military tactics. Political generals, who had in large part been responsible for the rout in 1967, were replaced with competent ones.

Related Topics:
1972 - MiG-23 - SA-6 - RPG-7 - AT-3 Sagger - Anti-tank guided missile - Military tactics

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The role of the great powers, too, was a major factor in the outcome of the two wars. The policy of the Soviet Union was one of the causes of Egypt's military weakness. While the U.S. and other allied nations supplied Israel with the most up-to-date assault weapons in the world, the Russians supplied Egypt only with defense weaponry, and then only with great reluctance. Indeed, President Nasser was only able to obtain the material for an anti-aircraft missile defense wall after having visited Moscow and pleaded with the Kremlin leaders. He claimed that if supplies were not given, he would have to return to Egypt and tell the Egyptian people Moscow had abandoned them, and then relinquish power to one of his peers who would be able to deal with the Americans. The Americans would then have the upper hand in the region, which Moscow could not permit.

Related Topics:
Missile - Moscow

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One of Egypt's undeclared objectives of the War of Attrition was to force the Soviet Union to supply Egypt with more advanced arms and war materiel. It was felt that the only way to convince the Soviet leaders of the deficiencies of most of the aircraft and air defense weaponry they had supplied to Egypt following 1967 was to put them to the test against the advanced weaponry which the U.S. had supplied to Israel.

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Nasser's policy following the 1967 defeat conflicted with that of the Soviet Union. The Soviets sought to push Egypt towards a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. At all costs they wanted to avoid a new conflagration between the Arabs and Israelis so as not to be drawn into a confrontation with the United States. The reality of the situation became apparent when the superpowers met in Oslo and agreed to maintain the status quo. This was unacceptable to Egyptian leaders, and when it was discovered that the Egyptian preparations for crossing the canal were being leaked, it became imperative to expel the Russians from Egypt. In July 1972 Sadat expelled almost all of the 20,000 Soviet military advisors in the country and reoriented the country's foreign policy to be more favourable to the United States.

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The Soviets thought little of Sadat's chances in any war. They warned that any attempt to cross the heavily fortified Suez would incur massive losses. The Soviets, who were then pursuing Detente, had no interest in seeing the Middle East destabilized. In a June 1973 meeting between U.S. President Richard Nixon and Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev, Brezhnev had proposed Israel pull back to its 1967 border. Brezhnev said that if Israel did not, "we will have difficulty keeping the military situation from flaring up"—an indication that the Soviet Union had been unable to restrain Sadat's plans. (Rabinovich, 39)

Related Topics:
Detente - Richard Nixon - Leonid Brezhnev

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In an interview published in Newsweek (April 9, 1973), President Sadat again threatened war with Israel. Several times during 1973, Arab forces conducted large-scale exercises that put the Israeli military on the highest level of alert, only to be recalled a few days later. The Israeli leadership already believed that if an attack took place, the Israeli Air Force would be able to repel it.

Related Topics:
Newsweek - April 9 - 1973 - Israeli Air Force

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Almost a full year before the war, in an October 24, 1972, meeting with his Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, Sadat declared his intention to go to war with Israel even without proper Soviet support (Rabinovich, 25). Planning was done in absolute secrecy—even the upper-echelon commanders were not told of war plans until less than a week prior to the attack, and the soldiers were not told until a few hours beforehand. The plan to attack Israel in concert with Syria was code-named Operation Badr (the Arabic word for "full moon").

Related Topics:
October 24 - 1972 - Arabic

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Lead up to the surprise attack

The IDF's Aman (Military Intelligence), "the leader of Israel's intelligence community," was responsible for formulating the nation's intelligence estimate (Rabinovich, 22). Their assessments on the likelihood of war were based on several assumptions. First, it was assumed correctly that Syria would not go to war with Israel unless Egypt went to war as well. Second, they learned from a high-ranking Egyptian informant (who to-this-day remains confidential, known only as "The Source") that Egypt wanted to regain all of the Sinai, but would not go to war until the Soviets had supplied Egypt with fighter-bombers to neutralize the Israeli Air Force, and Scud missiles to be used against Israeli cities as a deterrent against Israeli attacks on Egyptian infrastructure. Since the Soviets had not yet supplied the fighter bombers, and the Scud missiles had only arrived in Egypt in late August (it would take 4 months to train the Egyptian ground crews), Aman predicted war with Egypt was not imminent. This assumption about Egypt's strategic plans, known as "the concept," strongly colored their thinking and led them to dismiss other war warnings.

Related Topics:
Aman - Fighter-bomber - Scud missile

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The Egyptians did much to further this misconception. Both the Israelis and the Americans felt that the expulsion of the Soviet military observers had severely hurt the army. The Egyptians ensured that there was a continual stream of false information on maintenance problems and a lack of personnel to operate the most advanced equipment. The Egyptians made repeated reports on a non-existent lack of spare parts that also made their way to Israel. Sadat had long engaged in brinkmanship. Sadat had so frequently stated that the war would soon resume that the world ignored such declarations. In May and August 1973 the Egyptian army had engaged in exercises by the border. Both times the Israeli army had mobilized at the cost of some $10 million dollars.

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For the week leading up to Yom Kippur, the Egyptians staged a week-long training exercise adjacent to the Suez Canal. Israeli intelligence, detecting large troop movements towards the canal, dismissed them as more training exercises. Movement of Syrian troops towards the border was puzzling, but not a threat because, Aman believed, they would not attack without Egypt and Egypt would not attack until the Soviet weaponry arrived.

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The obvious reason for choosing the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur for staging a surprise attack on Israel was that on this specific day (unlike any other holiday) the country comes to a complete standstill. On Yom Kippur most Jews fast, abstain from any use of fire, electricity, engines, cars, communications, etc. Many soldiers leave military facilities for home during the holiday and Israel is most vulnerable, especially with much of its army unmobilized.

Related Topics:
Jewish - Yom Kippur - Fast

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Despite refusing to participate, King Hussein of Jordan "had met with Sadat and ' Assad in Alexandria two weeks before. Given the mutual suspicions prevailing among the Arab leaders, it was unlikely that he had been told any specific war plans. But it was probable that Sadat and Assad had raised the prospect of war against Israel in more general terms to feel out the likelihood of Jordan joining in" (Rabinovich, 51). On the night of September 25, Hussein secretly flew to Tel Aviv to warn Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir of an impending Syrian attack. "Are they going to war without the Egyptians, asked Mrs. Meir. The king said he didn't think so. 'I think they would cooperate'". (Rabinovich, 50) Surprisingly, this warning fell on deaf ears. Aman concluded that the king had not told it anything it did not already know. "Eleven warnings of war were received by Israel during September from well placed sources. But Zvi Zamir continued to insist that war was not an Arab option. Not even Hussein's warnings succeeded in stirring his doubts" (Rabinovich, 56). He would later remark that "We simply didn't feel them capable " (Rabinovich, 57).

Related Topics:
King Hussein - Jordan - Assad - September 25 - Tel Aviv - Golda Meir - Mossad - Zvi Zamir

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Finally, Zvi Zamir personally went to Europe to meet with The Source (the high-ranking Egyptian official), at midnight on October 5th/6th. At that meeting, the source informed him that a joint Syrian-Egyptian attack on Israel was imminent. It was this warning in particular, combined with the large number of other warnings, that finally goaded the Israeli high command into action. Just hours before the attack began, orders went out for a partial call-up of the Israeli reserves.{{ref|library}} Ironically, calling up the reserves proved to be easier than usual, as almost all of the troops were at synagogue or at home for the holiday.

Related Topics:
Reserves - Synagogue

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Lack of an Israeli Pre-emptive attack

Israeli strategy was, for the most part, based on the precept that if war was imminent, Israel would launch a pre-emptive strike. It was assumed that Israel's intelligence services would give, at the worst case, about 48 hours' notice prior to an Arab attack.

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Golda Meir, Moshe Dayan, and Israeli general David Elazar met at 8:05 AM the morning of Yom Kippur, 6 hours before the war was to begin. Dayan began the meeting by arguing that war was not a certainty. Elazar then presented his argument, in favor of a pre-emptive attack against Syrian airfields at noon, Syrian missiles at 3:00 PM, and Syrian ground forces at 5:00 PM. "When the presentations were done, the prime minister hemmed uncertainly for a few moments but then came to a clear decision. There would be no preemptive strike. Israel might be needing American assistance soon and it was imperative that it not be blamed for starting the war. "If we strike first, we won't get help from anybody", she said" (Rabinovich, 89). European nations, under threat of an Arab oil embargo and trade boycott, had stopped supplying Israel with munitions. As a result, Israel was totally dependent on the United States to resupply its army, and was particularly sensitive to anything that might endanger that relationship.

Related Topics:
Golda Meir - Moshe Dayan - David Elazar - Oil - Embargo - Trade - Boycott - Munition

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In retrospect, the decision not to strike first was a sound one. Operation Nickel Grass, the American airlift of supplies during the war which began on October 13, while it did not immediately replace Israel's losses in equipment, did allow it to expend what it did have more freely (Rabinovich, 491). Had they struck first, according to Henry Kissinger, they would not have received "so much as a nail".

Related Topics:
Operation Nickel Grass - Airlift - Henry Kissinger

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