War of the Austrian Succession

The War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748). Maria Theresa of Austria succeeded her father Charles VI, Holy Roman Emperor in his Habsburg dominions in 1740, namely becoming Queen of Hungary and Bohemia, Archduchess of Austria, and Duchess of Parma, Piacenza, and Guastalla. For a woman to inherit such vast territories involved many complications, which were perceived long before, and Emperor Charles VI had long anticipated them, getting all the other powers to agree to the Pragmatic Sanction of 1713. The plan was for her to succeed to the hereditary Habsburg domains, and her husband, Francis I, Duke of Lorraine, to be elected Holy Roman Emperor. Frederick II of Prussia, having not himself agreed to the Pragmatic Sanction, invaded Silesia, using some unsettled dynastic claims as a pretext. Maria Theresa, as a woman, was perceived (incorrectly) as weak, and some other princes (such as Charles Albert of Bavaria) alleged rights to the crown.

General Character of the War

Little needs to be said of the military features of the war. The intervention of Prussia as a military power was indeed a striking phenomenon, but her triumph was in a great measure due to her fuller application of principles of tactics and discipline universally recognized though less universally enforced. The other powers reorganised their forces after the war, not so much on the Prussian model as on the basis of a stricter application of known general principles. Prussia, moreover, was far ahead of all the other continental powers in administration, and over Austria, in particular, her advantage in this matter was almost decisive of the struggle. Added to this was the personal ascendancy of Frederick, not yet a great general, but energetic and resolute, and, further, opposed to generals who were responsible for their men to their individual sovereigns. These advantages have been decisive in many wars, almost in all. The special feature of the war of 1740 to 1748, and of other wars of the time, is the extraordinary disparity between the end and the means. The political schemes to be executed by the French and other armies were as grandiose as any of modern times. Their execution, under the then conditions of time and space, invariably fell short of expectation, and the history of the war proves, as that of the Seven Years' War was to prove, that the small standing army of the 18th century could conquer by degrees, but could not deliver a decisive blow. Frederick alone, with a definite end and proportionate means wherewith to achieve it, succeeded completely. The French, in spite of their later victories, obtained so little of what they fought for that Parisians could say to each other, when they met in the streets, "You are as stupid as the Peace". And if, when fighting for their own hand, the governments of Europe could so fail of their purpose, even less was to be expected when the armies were composed of allied contingents, sent to the war each for a different object. The allied national armies of 1813 co-operated loyally, for they had much at stake and worked for a common object. Those of 1741 represented the divergent private interests of the several dynasties, and achieved nothing.

Related Topics:
1740 - 1748 - Seven Years' War - 18th century - 1813 - 1741

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