Unexpected hanging paradox

The unexpected hanging paradox is a paradox involving logic. It is alternatively known as the hangman paradox, the fire drill paradox, or the unexpected exam paradox.

Annotated Bibliography

C. S. Chihara, "Olin, Quine, and the Surprise Examination" Philosophical Studies 1985, vol. 47, pp. 19-26. The author claims that the prisoner assumes, falsely, that if he knows some proposition, then he also knows that he knows it.

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R. Kirkham, "On Paradoxes and a Surprise Exam," Philosophia 1991, vol. 21, pp. 31-51. The author defends and extends Wright and Sudbury's solution. He also updates the history and bibliography of Margalit and Bar-Hillel up to 1991.

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A. Margalit and M. Bar-Hillel, "Expecting the Unexpected", Philosophia 1983, vol. 13, pp. 337-44. A history and bibliography of writings on the paradox up to 1983.

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D. J. O'Connor, "Pragmatic Paradoxes", Mind 1948, Vol. 57, pp. 358-9. The first appearance of the paradox in print. The author claims that certain contingent future tense statements cannot come true.

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M. Scriven, "Paradoxical Announcements", Mind 1951, vol. 60, pp. 403-7. The author critiques O'Connor and discovers the paradox as we know it today.

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R. Shaw, "The Unexpected Examination" Mind 1958, vol. 67, pp. 382-4. The author claims that the prisoner's premises are self-referring.

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C. Wright and A. Sudbury, "the Paradox of the Unexpected Examination," Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1977, vol. 55, pp. 41-58. The first complete formalization of the paradox, and a proposed solution to it.

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