Somaliland

Somaliland (Somali: Soomaaliland) is a former British territory located in the northwest region of Somalia in the Horn of Africa. In May of 1991, northern clans declared an independent Republic of Somaliland that now includes five of the eighteen administrative regions of Somalia, roughly the region between Ethiopia, Djibouti and the Gulf of Aden, an area of about 137,600 square kilometres. The capital of Somaliland is Hargeisa.

Politics

While the majority of Somalilanders come from the Isaaq clan, many are members of the Dir (Gadabuursi and Ciise) and Harti/Darood (Warsangeli and Dulbahante) clans. Thus, although ethnically diverse, Somaliland has managed to transcend clan differences by uniting through its independent and self-determining political culture as well as collective fear of domination by the south. Lack of international recognition has meant that Somaliland has not had access to forms of governance support for peace-building and reconstruction, although international aid organizations have done much to help restore essential services and infrastructure, clear land mines, reintegrate displaced populations, promote indigenous welfare organizations, and more recently to strengthen government bodies. As a result, Somaliland has performed much of its political reconstruction indigenously from the ?bottom up.? Consequently, Somaliland has formed a hybrid system of governance combining traditional and western institutions. In a series of inter-clan conferences, culminating in the Borama Conference in 1993, a beel (clan or community) system of government was constructed, which consisted of an Executive, with a President, Vice President, and Council of Ministers, a bicameral Legislature, and an independent judiciary. The traditional Somali council of elders (guurti) was incorporated into the governance structure and formed the upper house, responsible for selecting a President as well as managing internal conflicts. Government became in essence a "power-sharing coalition of Somaliland's main clans," with seats in the Upper and Lower houses proportionally allocated to clans according to a pre-determined formula. In 2002, after several extensions of this interim government, Somaliland finally made the transition to multi-party democracy, with district council elections contested by six parties, considered the "most peaceful in Africa for twenty years." The district elections also determined which parties were allowed to contest the parliamentary and presidential elections, where a party was required to demonstrate at least twenty percent of the popular vote from four out of the six regions. This important caveat insured that parties would focus on consensus building and would not organize around ethnic lines. Subsequently, three parties were selected to submit presidential candidates: the Democratic United Peoples? Movement (UDUB), Kulmiye, and the Party for Justice and Democracy (UCID). On April 14, 2003, 488,543 voters participated the presidential elections, which ran more or less smoothly. The result was a slim eighty vote controversial victory for UDUB over the Kulmiye, complicated by allegations of ballot stuffing against the incumbent UDUB. Despite calls for the Kulmiye to form a rival government, the party?s leadership did not do so, instead choosing to abide by the ruling of an admittedly unqualified Supreme Court that upheld UDUB?s victory. Despite minor demonstrations, the transition to the presidency of Daahir Rayaale Kaahin proceeded peacefully. This transition, combined with the fact that Kaahin was not a member of the dominant Isaaq clan, speaks volumes about the inter-clan commitment to peace-building and the rule of law. It could be, according to Steve Kibble, "the first indigenous modern African form of government." Without a doubt, the Somaliland government holds legitimacy in the eyes of its own people.

Related Topics:
Isaaq - Land mine - Borama - Democratic United Peoples? Movement (UDUB) - Daahir Rayaale Kaahin

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Somaliland boasts a constitution, a functional parliament and government ministries, an army, a police force, judiciary, and many of the signs of statehood, including a flag, currency, and passports. Nonetheless, it faces some significant problems to its continued survival. Like other Somali governments, it lacks a consistent taxation base and receives most of its support from private actors. Corruption remains a problem, women are virtually unrepresented in government, and there are growing concerns about voting patterns based on ethnic lines as well as the virtual monopoly that UDUB has gained over both the regional councils and presidency in a majoritarian political context. Moreover, the large part of Somalilanders still harbour vivid memories of a predatory and extractive central state and are therefore wary of the construction of any strong central authority; this is evident in the importance placed on the role of the regional councils in dealing with local problems. According to Ken Menkhaus, popular opinion in the northwest holds that Somaliland enjoys peace, reconciliation, lawfulness, and relative prosperity "despite, not because of, the existence of a central government there." It can be argued that attempts in Somalia to revive a centralized state have exacerbated armed conflict, in particular during the period of the emergence of the Transitional National Government (TNG); it appears that "state-building and peace-building are two separate, and, in some respects, mutually antagonistic enterprises in Somalia." Now that the TNG has been placed on the back burner, the 'building block' approach to Somali state building has again returned to prominence. Although many nascent states along the Somaliland model have been tried and have failed, renewed efforts are taking place in Puntland, Bay and Bakool, and other regions. Yet, the question remains on whether the Somaliland model can be employed in the more troubled southern regions of Somalia. The south received the brunt of the civil war in the 1990s and was also the primary area affected by UN intervention, which strengthened the hold of the warlords. In addition, in the south the conflict undermined many of the relations between the clans, and helped widen clan divisions in an already heterogeneous region. Thus, prospects for peace-building must focus on the kind of grass-roots model employed in Somaliland. These initiatives can only succeed, however, if regional polities focus on power-sharing and compromise, rather than on an ethnically hegemonic attempt to control political resources.

Related Topics:
Flag - Currency - Passport - Puntland - Bay and Bakool

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