Six-Day War

The Six-Day War (Hebrew: ????? ??? ????? transliteration: Milhemet Sheshet Hayamim), also known as the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Six Days' War, or June War, was fought between Israel and its Arab neighbors Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. It began when Israel launched what it considered a pre-emptive attack against Egypt, following the latter's closure of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping and the deployment of troops in the Sinai near the Israeli border, and after months of increasingly tense border incidents and diplomatic crises. By its end Israel controlled the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights. The results of the war affect the geopolitics of the region to this day.

Background

The 1956 Suez War was a military defeat, but a political victory, for Egypt. Heavy diplomatic pressure from both the United States and the Soviet Union forced Israel to withdraw its military from the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip. After the 1956 war Egypt agreed to the stationing of a UN peacekeeping force in the Sinai, U.N.E.F. (United Nations Emergency Force), to keep that border region demilitarized, and prevent guerrillas from crossing the border into Israel. As a result the border between Egypt and Israel quieted for a while.

Related Topics:
1956 Suez War - Egypt - United States - Soviet Union - Israel - Sinai Peninsula - Gaza Strip - U.N.E.F.

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

The aftermath of the 1956 war saw the region return to an uneasy balance without any real resolution of the region's difficulties. At the time no Arab state had recognized Israel. Syria, aligned with the Soviet bloc, started sponsoring guerilla raids on Israel in the early 60's as part of its "people's war of liberation" designed to deflect domestic opposition to the Ba'ath Party. {{ref|rabil}}

Related Topics:
1956 - Arab - Recognized - Soviet bloc - Ba'ath Party

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

Israel's National Water Carrier

In 1964 Israel began withdrawing water from the Jordan for its National Water Carrier. In the following year the Arab states began construction of their Headwater Diversion Plan, which, once completed, would divert the waters of the Dan/Baniyas so that the water would not enter Israel and the Sea of Galilee, but rather flow into a dam at Mukhaiba for Jordan and Syria and divert the waters of the Hasbani into the Litani in Lebanon. The diversion works would have reduced the installed capacity of Israel's carrier by about 35 per cent. The IDF attacked the diversion works in Syria in March, May and August of 1965 setting off a prolonged chain of border violence that linked directly to the events leading to war. {{ref|koboril129}}

Related Topics:
National Water Carrier - Sea of Galilee - Mukhaiba - Hasbani - Litani - Lebanon

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

Israel and Syria

In addition to sponsoring attacks against Israel (often through Jordanian territory, much to King Hussein's chagrin), Syria also began shelling Israeli civilian communities in north-eastern Galilee, from positions on the Golan Heights, as part of the dispute over control of the Demilitarized Zones (DZs), small parcels of land claimed by both Israel and Syria. {{ref|hajjar}}

Related Topics:
King Hussein - Galilee - Golan Heights

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

In 1966, Egypt and Syria signed a military alliance, initiated for both sides if either were to go to war. According to foreign minister Mahmoud Riad, Egypt had been persuaded to enter into the mutual defence pact by the Soviet Union. From the Soviet perspective the pact had two objectives: (1) to reduce the chances of a punitive attack on Syria by Israel and (2) to bring the Syrians under Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser?s moderate influence. {{ref|rikhye}}

Related Topics:
1966 - Mahmoud Riad - Soviet Union - Gamal Abdel Nasser

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

On April 7, 1967, a minor border incident escalated into a full-scale aerial battle over the Golan Heights, resulting in the loss of six Syrian MiG-21s to Israeli Air Force (IAF) Dassault Mirage III, and the latter's flight over Damascus. {{ref|aloni7April}} Drysdale and Hinnebusch report that Israeli tanks were concentrated on Syria's border and in a radio address Yitzhak Rabin threatened to march on Damascus to overthrow the Syrian government. {{ref|drysdale}} In early May the Israeli cabinet authorized a limited strike against Syria and Rabin's renewed demand for a large-scale strike to discredit or topple the Ba'ath regime was opposed by Eshkol. {{ref|oren51}} Border incidents multiplied and numerous Arab leaders, both political and military, called for an end to Israeli reprisals. Egypt, then already trying to seize a central position in the Arab world under Nasser, accompanied these declarations with plans to re-militarize the Sinai. Syria shared these views, although it did not prepare for an immediate invasion. The Soviet Union actively backed the military needs of the Arab states. It was later revealed that on 13 May a Soviet intelligence report given by Nikolai Podgorny to Anwar Sadat claimed falsely that Israeli troops were massing along the Syrian border. {{ref|bregman}} {{ref|black}}

Related Topics:
April 7 - 1967 - MiG-21s - Israeli Air Force - Dassault Mirage III - Damascus - Yitzhak Rabin - Soviet Union - Arab states - 13 May - Nikolai Podgorny - Anwar Sadat

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

Withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force

On May 17, Nasser demanded that the U.N.E.F. evacuate the Sinai, a request with which UN Secretary-General U Thant complied, thus removing the international buffer which had existed along the Egyptian-Israeli border since 1957. {{ref|bbconthisday}} The UN asked to move its force to Israel, but Israel refused to allow UN peacekeepers to deploy on its territory. Nasser then began the re-militarization of the Sinai, and concentrated tanks and troops on the border with Israel.

Related Topics:
May 17 - U.N.E.F. - Sinai - U Thant

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

The Straits of Tiran

On May 23, Egypt closured the Straits of Tiran to all shipments bound for Israel, thus blockading the Israeli port of Eilat at the northern end of the Gulf of Aqaba. Also, Nasser stated, "Under no circumstances can we permit the Israeli flag to pass through the Gulf of Aqaba." While most of Israel's commerce used Mediterranean ports, and, according to John Quigley, no Israeli-flag vessel had used the port of Eilat for the two years preceding June 1967, oil carried on non-Israeli flag vessels to Eilat was a very significant import.{{ref|quigleylaw}} {{ref|rezun}} There were ambiguities, however, about how rigorous the blockade would be, particularly whether it would apply to non-Israeli flag vessels. Citing international law {{ref|un}} Israel considered the closure of the straits to be illegal, and it had stated it would consider the blockade a casus belli in 1957 when it withdrew from the Sinai and Gaza. {{ref|meir}} The Arab States disputed Israel's right of passage through the Straits, noting that they had not signed the Territorial Sea Convention specifically because of article 16(4) which provided Israel with that right. {{ref|christie}} In the UN General Assembly debates immediately after the war, many nations argued that even if international law gave Israel the right of passage, Israel was not entitled to attack Egypt to assert it because the closure was not an "armed attack" as defined by article 51 of the UN Charter. Similarly, international law professor John Quigley argues that under the doctrine of proportionality, Israel would only be entitled to use such force as would be necessary to secure its right of passage. {{ref|quigley}}

Related Topics:
May 23 - Straits of Tiran - Eilat - Gulf of Aqaba - John Quigley - Israel - Casus belli - Sinai - Gaza - UN General Assembly - UN Charter

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

Israel viewed the closure of the straits with some alarm and the U.S. and U.K. were asked to open the Straits of Tiran, as they guaranteed they would in 1957. Harold Wilson's proposal of an international maritime force to quell the crisis was adopted by President Johnson, but received little support, with only Britain and the Netherlands offering to contribute ships.

Related Topics:
Straits of Tiran - 1957 - Harold Wilson

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

Egypt and Jordan

Nasser's pan-Arabism had numerous supporters in Jordan (in spite of Hussein, who felt it threatened his authority); and so, on May 30, Jordan signed a mutual defense treaty with Egypt, thereby joining the military alliance already in place between Egypt and Syria. President Nasser, who had called King Hussein an "imperialist lackey" just days earlier, declared: "Our basic objective will be the destruction of Israel. The Arab people want to fight." {{ref|bbconthisday2}}

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

At the end of May Jordanian forces were given to the command of an Egyptian general Abdul Munim Riad. {{ref|mutawi}} Israel called upon Jordan numerous times to refrain from hostilities. Hussein, however, was caught on the horns of a galling dilemma: allow Jordan to be dragged into war and face the brunt of the Israeli response, or remain neutral and risk full-scale insurrection among his own people. Army Commander-in-Chief General Sharif Zaid Ben Shaker warned in a press conference at the end of May "If Jordan does not join the war a civil war will erupt in Jordan". {{ref|mutawi2}}

Related Topics:
Abdul Munim Riad - Sharif Zaid Ben Shaker

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

Israel's own sense of concern regarding Jordan's future role originated in Jordanian control of the West Bank. This put Arab forces just 17 kilometers from Israel's coast, a jump-off point from which a well co-ordinated tank assault could cut Israel in two within half an hour. Although the size of Jordan's army meant that Jordan was probably incapable of executing such a maneuver, the country was perceived as having a history of being used by other Arab states as staging grounds for operations against Israel; thus, attack from the West Bank was always viewed by the Israeli leadership as a threat to Israel's existence. At the same time several other Arab states not bordering Israel, including Iraq, Sudan, Kuwait and Algeria, began mobilising their armed forces.

Related Topics:
West Bank - Staging grounds

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

The drift to war

Israel's foreign minister Abba Eban wrote in his autobiography that when he was told by U Thant of Nasser's promise not to attack Israel he found this reassurance convincing as "...Nasser did not want war; he wanted victory without war". {{ref|eban371}} {{ref|rubenberg}} Writing from Egypt on 4 June New York Times journalist James Reston observed: "Cairo does not want war and it is certainly not ready for war. But it has already accepted the possibility, even the likelihood, of war, as if it had lost control of the situation." {{ref|reston4june}}

Related Topics:
Foreign minister - Abba Eban - U Thant - 4 June - New York Times - James Reston

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

In a speech before Israeli National Defense College, Menachem Begin stated that Israel was the one who made the decision to attack: "The Egyptian army concentrations in the Sinai approaches do not prove that Nasser was really about to attack us. We must be honest with ourselves. We decided to attack him." However, he reminded his audience of the wars where Arabs were the ones who made the final decision to attack. Each of them took a terrible toll in human lives in Israel, up to 1% of the total population in the War of Independence. In this instance, he felt pre-emption was justified, and therefore quickly added: "This was a war of self-defense in the noblest sense of the term." {{ref|begin}} Writing in 2002 American National Public Radio journalist Mike Shuster expressed a view that was prevalent in Israel before the war that the country "was surrounded by Arab states dedicated to its eradication. Egypt was ruled by Gamal Abdel Nasser, a firebrand nationalist whose army was the strongest in the Arab Middle East. Syria was governed by the radical Baathist Party, constantly issuing threats to push Israel into the sea." {{ref|shusternpr}} With what Israel saw as provocative acts by Nasser, including the blockade of the Straits and the mobilisation of forces in the Sinai, creating military and economic pressure, and the United States temporizing because of its entanglement in Vietnam War, Israel's political and military elite came to feel that preemption was not merely militarily preferable, but transformative.

Related Topics:
American - National Public Radio - Mike Shuster - Baathist Party - Vietnam War

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

The condition of Egypt's forces

Some of Nasser's commanders believed that Egypt was in no position to fight. A third of its troops were bogged down in a civil war in Yemen, while Egyptian military communication and supply lines were in bad shape. Nasser's ambivalence about his goals and objectives was reflected in his orders to the military. The general staff changed the operational plan four times in May 1967, with each change requiring the redeployment of troops to a new location, with the inevitable toll on both men and vehicles. Towards the end of May Nasser finally forbade the general staff from proceeding with the Qahir ("Victory") plan, which called for a light infantry screen in the forward fortifications with the bulk of the forces held back to conduct a massive counterattack against the main Israeli advance when identified, and ordered a forward defense of the Sinai. {{ref|pollack}} In the mean time, he continued to take actions intended to increase the level of mobilisation of Egypt, Syria and Jordan, in order to bring unbearable pressure on Israel.

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

Diplomacy and Intelligence assessments

The Israeli cabinet met on 23 May and decided to launch a pre-emptive strike if the Straits of Tiran were not re-opened by 25 May. Following an approach from US undersecretary of state Eugene Rostow to allow time for the negotiation of a nonviolent solution Israel agreed to a delay of ten days to two weeks. {{ref|gelpi}}

Related Topics:
23 May - 25 May - Eugene Rostow

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

On May 26, 1967, Foreign Minister of Israel Abba Eban landed in Washington with the goal of ascertaining from the American administration its position in the event of the outbreak of war. As soon as Eban arrived, he was handed a cable from the Israeli government, and in it the false information that Israel had learned of an Egyptian and Syrian plan to launch a war of annihilation against Israel within the next 48 hours. Eban met with Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, and finally with President Johnson. The Americans said their intelligence sources could not corroborate the claim; the Egyptian positions in the Sinai remained defensive. Eban left the White House distraught. Historian Michael Oren explains his reaction: "Eban was livid. Unconvinced that Nasser was either determined or even able to attack, he now saw Israelis inflating the Egyptian threat - and flaunting their weakness - in order to extract a pledge that the president, Congress-bound, could never make. 'An act of momentous irresponsibility... eccentric...' were his words for the cable, which, he wrote, 'lacked wisdom, veracity and tactical understanding. Nothing was right about it'." {{ref|oren102}} In a lecture given in 2002, Oren said, "Johnson sat around with his advisors and said, ‘What if their intelligence sources are better than ours?’ Johnson decided to fire off a Hotline message to his counterpart in the Kremlin, Alexey Kosygin, in which he said, ‘We've heard from the Israelis, but we can't corroborate it, that your proxies in the Middle East, the Egyptians, plan to launch an attack against Israel in the next 48 hours. If you don't want to start a global crisis, prevent them from doing that.’ At 2:30 AM on May 27, Soviet Ambassador to Egypt Dimitri Pojidaev knocked on Nasser's door and read him a personal letter from Kosygin in which he said, ‘We don't want Egypt to be blamed for starting a war in the Middle East. If you launch that attack, we cannot support you.’ `Amer consulted his sources in the Kremlin, and they corroborated the substance of Kosygin's message. Despondent, Amer told the commander of Egypt's air force, Major General Mahmud Sidqi, that the operation was cancelled." {{ref|orenlecture}} According to then Egyptian Vice-President Hussein al Shafei as soon as Nasser knew what Amer planned he cancelled the operation. {{ref|bowen57}}

Related Topics:
May 26 - 1967 - Abba Eban - Dean Rusk - Robert McNamara - Johnson - Michael Oren - Hotline - Alexey Kosygin - May 27 - Dimitri Pojidaev - `Amer - Mahmud Sidqi - Hussein al Shafei

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

On 30 May Nasser responded to Johnson's request of eleven days earlier and agreed to send his vice-president, Zakkariya Muhieddin, to Washington on 7 June to explore a diplomatic settlement in "precisely the opening the White House had sought". {{ref|oren145}} US Secretary of State Dean Rusk was bitterly disappointed by Israel's pre-emptive strike on 5 June as he had been certain he would have been able to find a diplomatic solution if the meeting had gone ahead. {{ref|cristol}} Historian Michael Oren writes that Rusk was "mad as hell" and that Johnson later wrote "I have never concealed my regret that Israel decided to move when it did". {{ref|oren196}}

Related Topics:
30 May - Zakkariya Muhieddin - 7 June - White House - Secretary of State - Dean Rusk - 5 June - Michael Oren

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

Within Israel's political leadership, it was decided that if the US would not act, and if the UN could not act, then Israel would have to act. On June 1, Moshe Dayan was made defense minister, and on June 3 the Johnson administration gave an ambiguous statement; Israel continued to prepare for war. Israel's attack against Egypt on June 5 began what would later be dubbed the Six-Day War. Martin van Creveld explains the impetus to war: "...the concept of 'defensible borders' was not even part part of the IDFs own vocabulary. Anyone who will look for it in the military literature of the time will do so in vain. Instead, Israel's commanders based their thought on the 1948 war and, especially, their 1956 triumph over the Egyptians in which, from then chief of staff Dayan down, they had gained their spurs. When the 1967 crisis broke they felt certain of their ability to win a 'decisive, quick and elegant' victory, as one of their number, General Haim Bar Lev, put it, and pressed the government to start the war as soon as possible". {{ref|vanCreveld}}

Related Topics:
Moshe Dayan - June 3 - Johnson - June 5 - Martin van Creveld - Haim Bar Lev

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

The confidence of Israel's leaders was well founded. In May 1967 the Egyptian army had a nominal strength of around 150,000, but 50-70,000 troops, including the elite units, were fighting in the civil war in Yemen. {{ref|gat}} Jordan's army had a total strength of 55,000, {{ref|mutawijordan}} but it too was embroiled in the fighting in Yemen. Syria's army had 75,000 troops. {{ref|syria}} The IDF had a total strength, including reservists, of 264,000. {{ref|stoneisrael}} James Reston, writing in the New York Times on 23 May 1967 noted, "In discipline, training, morale, equipment and general competence his army and the other Arab forces, without the direct assistance of the Soviet Union, are no match for the Israelis... Even with 50,000 troops and the best of his generals and air force in Yemen, he has not been able to work his way in that small and primitive country, and even his effort to help the Congo rebels was a flop." {{ref|reston24may}}

Related Topics:
Yemen - 23 May

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~