Ryti-Ribbentrop Agreement

The Ryti-Ribbentrop letter of agreement (Finnish: Ryti-Ribbentrop sopimus) of June 26, 1944, signifies the closest to an alliance Finland and Nazi Germany came during World War II. According to the agreement, Risto Ryti, then President of Finland, undertook not to conclude peace in the Continuation War with the Soviet Union unless in agreement with Nazi Germany. The deal was the result of negotiations with Joachim von Ribbentrop, the Third Reich's foreign minister, who surprisingly had arrived in Helsinki on June 22. The letter was given after considerations with Marshal Mannerheim and the war cabinet, but was expressed as Ryti's personal undertaking, deliberately avoiding the form of a binding treaty between the governments of Finland and Nazi Germany, that had required involvement of the Parliament of Finland.

Related Topics:
Finnish - June 26 - 1944 - Finland - Nazi Germany - World War II - Risto Ryti - President of Finland - Continuation War - Soviet Union - Joachim von Ribbentrop - June 22 - Marshal Mannerheim - Parliament of Finland

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The agreement was obsoleted as Ryti resigned on July 31, 1944, and was succeeded as president by Mannerheim. Mannerheim, when queried by the head of the German headquarters, OKW, Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, informed the Germans that he did not consider him or Finland bound by Ryti's concession. Within six weeks, Finland had concluded an armistice with the Soviet Union. In accordance with the armistice conditions, the Lapland War was commenced to evacuate the Wehrmacht from Northern Finland by force.

Related Topics:
July 31 - 1944 - OKW - Wilhelm Keitel - Lapland War - Wehrmacht

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In retrospect, it has turned out that the Ryti-Ribbentrop agreement was less significant for the outcome of the war than it appeared in June 1944. The Wehrmacht had already delivered critical anti-tank weapons and sent a significant air-force detachment to support the defence on the Karelian isthmus. In fact, all necessary military aid was already in Finland or en route when Ribbentrop started pressuring president Ryti; and the German diplomacy and military headquarters seemingly acted independently of each other. Before the Soviet summer offensive of 1944, Finland's army was estimated to bind at least 26 divisions, 5 brigades and 16 regiments of the Red Army. The Wehrmacht had every reason to utilize the Finns as sort of a rear-troop, still strong and still very dedicated their task to defend their homeland from a Communist invasion, while the Germans retreated and evacuated Russia — and soon Balticum.

Related Topics:
Karelian isthmus - Red Army - Balticum

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The German foreign ministry at Wilhelmstrasse, on the other hand, wanted to exploit Finland's precarious situation after the fall of Vyborg to connect military aid to political concessions. Ryti and Mannerheim were not able to know the internal balance between OKW and Wilhelmstrasse; and the stakes were too high to risk that Ribbentrop's ministry could effectively pressure the Wehrmacht to withdraw its support from Finland.

Related Topics:
Wilhelmstrasse - Vyborg

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