Planned Parenthood v. Casey

Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in which the constitutionality of several Pennsylvania state regulations regarding abortion was challenged. The Court's lead plurality opinion upheld the right to have an abortion but lowered the standard for analyzing restrictions of that right, invalidating one regulation but upholding the others.

The Court's opinions

Casey is a divided judgment, in that none of the Justices' opinions was joined by a majority of justices. However, the plurality decision jointly written by Justices Souter, O'Connor, and Kennedy is recognized as the lead opinion with precedential weight because each of its parts were concurred in by at least two other Justices, albeit different ones for each part.

Related Topics:
O'Connor - Kennedy - Precedent

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Justices Blackmun and Stevens concurred with the parts of the Court's decision that upheld Roe and invalidated one of the Pennsylvania regulations. On the other side, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia each wrote opinions concurring in the parts of the Court's decisions that weakened Roe and upheld abortion regulations and dissented from the rest. Both Rehnquist and Scalia joined each other's concurrence/dissent, and Justices White and Thomas joined both.

Related Topics:
Blackmun - Stevens - Chief Justice - Rehnquist - Scalia - White - Thomas

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The O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter plurality opinion

Though the plurality opinion stated that it was upholding what it called the "essential holding" of Roe, it did not leave it intact. The Court emphasized the right to abortion as "grounded in the general sense of liberty" under the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than recognizing a general right to privacy that had been implied in previous cases.

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However, the Court overturned the strict trimester formula used in Roe to weigh the woman's interest in obtaining an abortion against the State's interest in the life of the fetus. Continuing advancements in medical technology meant that at the time Casey was decided, a fetus might be considered viable at 22 or 23 weeks rather than at the 28 weeks that was more common at the time of Roe. The Court recognized viability as the point at which the State interest in the life of the fetus outweighs the rights of the woman and abortion may be banned entirely.

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The Court also replaced the heightened scrutiny of abortion regulations under Roe, which was standard for fundamental rights in the Court's case law, with a lesser "undue burden" standard previously unknown in the Court's case law. A legal restriction posing an undue burden was defined as one having "the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus."

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Applying this new standard to the Pennsylvania Act under challenge, the Court struck the spousal notification requirement, stating that it gave too much power to husbands over their wives and would worsen situations of spousal abuse. The Court upheld the State's 24 hour waiting period, informed consent, and parental notification requirements, holding that none constituted an undue burden.

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