Operation Barbarossa

Operation Barbarossa (Unternehmen Barbarossa) was the German codename for Nazi Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union during World War II that commenced on June 22, 1941. It was to be the turning point for the fortunes of Hitler's Third Reich in that the failure of Operation Barbarossa arguably resulted in the eventual overall defeat of Nazi Germany. The Eastern Front which was opened by Operation Barbarossa would become the biggest theatre of war in World War II, with some of the largest and most brutal battles, terrible loss of life, and miserable conditions for Soviets and Germans alike. The operation was named after the emperor Frederick Barbarossa of the Holy Roman Empire.

Soviet preparations

Coming into the 1940s, the Soviet Union was by no means a weak country. Rapid Soviet industrialization in the 1930s had resulted in industrial output being second only to that of the United States, and equal to that of Nazi Germany. Production of military items grew steadily, and in the pre-war years the economy became progressively oriented toward military production.

Related Topics:
1940s - Soviet Union - Soviet industrialization - 1930s - United States

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It is often claimed erroneously that in 1941 the Soviet armed forces outnumbered their German counterparts by a great margin. This widespread misunderstanding likely emanates from comparing the overall size of the Soviet armed forces (which in early July 1941 amounted to a little more than 5 million men) to just the German land forces deployed for Barbarossa. In reality, the total size of the German armed forces exceeded the Soviet. However, on mobilisation the Red Army gained steadily in strength, and it could also deploy a greater share of that strength on this front than the Germans could. While the strength of both sides varied, in general it is accurate to say that the 1941 campaign was fought on terms of approximate numerical parity.

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In some key weapons systems, however, the Soviet numerical advantage was considerable. In tanks, for example, the Red Army did possess a large superiority, as it could field about 24,000 tanks against the German 3,350. The number of artillery pieces and aircraft was also heavily in the Soviets' favor. However, the Soviet numerical advantage was more than offset by the superior average quality of German planes along with the much superior training and readiness of German forces. The Soviet officer corps and high command had also been decimated by Stalin's Great Purge (1935–1938), during which almost one-third of experienced Red Army officers and almost all of its generals were executed or shipped to Siberia, replaced with officers deemed more "politically reliable." Of the five prewar Marshalls, three were executed; about two-thirds of the Corps and Division commanders were shot. This often left younger, less well-trained officers in their places. These officers tended to be very reluctant to take individual initiative.

Related Topics:
Great Purge - Red Army

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Virtually all Soviet units were on a peacetime footing. Aviation units had their aircraft parked in closely-bunched neat rows, rather than dispersed as they would have been under normal wartime procedure. As a result they made easy targets for German ground-attack aircraft. The Red air force was forbidden to shoot down German reconnaissance aircraft despite hundreds of pre-war flights into the USSR's airspace. The Soviet fighter force was equipped primarily with obsolescent aircraft such as the I-15 biplane and the I-16, with only a few of the newer MiG and LaGG fighters available. Few aircraft had radios; the few radios available did not work reliably; air combat tactics were primitive.

Related Topics:
I-15 - Biplane - I-16

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On the ground, the Red Army was dispersed and unprepared. Units were often separated and without transportation to concentrate prior to combat. Although the Red Army had numerous, well-designed artillery pieces, many of the guns had no ammunition. Artillery units often lacked transportation to move their guns into combat. Tank units were large and well-equipped, but lacked training and logistical support. Maintenance standards were very poor. Units were sent into combat with no arrangements for refueling, ammunition resupply, or personnel replacement. Often, after a single engagement units were often destroyed or rendered ineffective. The fact that the Army was in the midst of reorganizing the armor units into large Tank Corps added to the disorganization.

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As a result, although on paper the Red Army in 1941 seemed at least the equal of the German army, the reality in the field was far different; incompetent officers, as well as partial lack of equipment, insufficient motorised logistical support, and poor training placed the Red Army at a severe disadvantage when facing the Germans.

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One area of exception to this rule was the T-34 tank, which was coming into service with the Red Army in 1941. The T-34 was a revolutionary tank design, setting new standards for maneuverability, firepower, and armor protection. It came as a rude surprise to the German army in 1941, and the T-34 remained arguably superior to any German tank all the way until 1943. However, few T-34s were at the front in 1941, the crews of those that did exist had received little training, and early versions of T-34s had regular engine and drivetrain breakdowns. Therefore the T-34 was not a significant factor in the opening months of Operation Barbarossa.

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Soviet propaganda in pre-war years, of course, invariably stated that the Red Army was very strong and could easily defeat any aggressor.

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Having fielded officers who were certain to tell Stalin only what he wanted to hear, together with having an ill-founded confidence in the non-aggression pact, Stalin was led to believe that the position of the Soviet Union in early 1941 was much stronger than it actually was. In the spring of 1941, Stalin's own intelligence services made regular and repeated warnings of an impending German attack. Stalin's belief in his officers and military strength was so strong that he and his general staff, although acknowledging the possibility of an attack in general and making significant preparations, decided not to run the risk of provoking Hitler. Consequently, the Soviet border troops were not put on full alert and even forbidden to fire back without permission when attacked — though a partial alert was implemented on 10 April — and they were simply not ready when the German attack came. A plan by Zhukov for a preemptive strike was rejected by Stalin. Stalin also refused to fully mobilise the army.

Related Topics:
10 April - Zhukov

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Nevertheless, enormous Soviet forces were massed behind the western border in case the Germans did attack. However, these forces were very vulnerable due to changes in the tactical doctrine of the Red Army. In 1938 it had adopted, on the instigation of General Pavlov, a standard linear defence tactic on a line with other nations. Infantry divisions, reinforced by an organic tank component, would be dug in to form heavily fortified zones. Then came the shock of the Fall of France. The French Army, considered the second strongest in the world (after the Red Army), was defeated in a mere six weeks. Soviet analysis of events, based on incomplete information, concluded that the collapse of the French was caused by a reliance on linear defence and a lack of armoured reserves. The Soviets decided not to repeat these mistakes. Instead of digging in for linear defence, the infantry divisions would henceforth be concentrated in large mobile formations. All tanks would also be concentrated into 31 gigantic mechanised corps, each planned to be larger than a German Panzer Army (though few had already attained this size at 22 June). Should the Germans attack, their armoured spearheads would be cut off and wiped out by the mechanised corps. These would then cooperate with the infantry armies to drive back the German infantry, vulnerable in its approach march. The Soviet left wing, in Ukraine, was to be enormously reinforced to be able to execute a strategic envelopment: after destroying German Army Group South it would swing north through Poland in the back of Army Groups Centre and North. Then the complete annihilation of the encircled German Army would be inevitable, followed by the triumphant liberation of Europe.

Related Topics:
Tactical - Doctrine - Fall of France - 22 June

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