Operation Barbarossa

Operation Barbarossa (Unternehmen Barbarossa) was the German codename for Nazi Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union during World War II that commenced on June 22, 1941. It was to be the turning point for the fortunes of Hitler's Third Reich in that the failure of Operation Barbarossa arguably resulted in the eventual overall defeat of Nazi Germany. The Eastern Front which was opened by Operation Barbarossa would become the biggest theatre of war in World War II, with some of the largest and most brutal battles, terrible loss of life, and miserable conditions for Soviets and Germans alike. The operation was named after the emperor Frederick Barbarossa of the Holy Roman Empire.

Causes of the failure of Operation Barbarossa

The main cause of German failure was underestimating the capabilities of the Soviet Union and fierce resistance of the Soviet Army, and planning of the war turned out to be faulty from the logistical point of view.

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The grave and perilous situation in which the beleaguered German army found itself towards the end of 1941 was due to the increasing strength of the Red Army, compounded by a number of factors which in the short run severely restricted the effectiveness of the German forces. Chief among these were their overstretched deployment, a serious transport crisis affecting supply and movements, extreme weather and the eroded strength of most divisions.

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Parallels have been drawn with Napoleon's invasion of Russia.

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Underestimated Soviet potential

The Germans had grossly underestimated the mobilisation potential of the Red Army: its primary mobilisation size (i.e. the total of already trained units that could be put on a war-footing in short time) was about twice as large as they had expected it to be. By early August new armies had taken the place of the destroyed ones. This fact alone implied the failure of Operation Barbarossa, for the Germans now had to limit their operations for a month to bring up new supplies, leaving only six weeks to complete the battle before the start of the mud season, an impossible task. On the other hand, the Red Army proved capable of replacing its huge losses in a timely fashion, and was not destroyed as a coherent force. When the divisions consisting of conscripts trained before the war were destroyed, they were replaced by completely new ones, on average about half a million men being drafted each month for the duration of the war. It was this Soviet ability to mobilise vast, if often also badly trained and equipped, forces in a short time and on a continual basis which allowed the Soviet Union to survive the critical first six months of the war, and the grave underestimation of this capacity which rendered German planning unrealistic.

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In addition, data collected by Soviet intelligence excluded the possibility of the war with Japan, which allowed the Soviets to transfer forces from Far East to the European theatre in critical moments.

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And even if the Germans had fulfilled the original plan—reached the Arkhangelsk–Volga line—it probably would not have ended the war. The Soviet Union still had vast reserves in the eastern part of the country and managed to move its war industry to the Urals, Central Asia, and Siberia, so the war could have continued for a long time.

Related Topics:
Arkhangelsk - Volga - Ural - Central Asia - Siberia

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Faults of logistical planning

The objectives of Operation Barbarossa were quite unrealistic from the very beginning. The start of the war, in the dry summer, was the most favorable for Germans, as they took the Soviets by surprise and destroyed a large part of the Soviet army in the first weeks. When favorable weather conditions gave way to harsh conditions of the fall and winter and the Soviet Army recovered from the initial setbacks, the German offensive began to fail. The German army could not be sufficiently supplied for a prolonged combat; indeed there was simply not enough fuel available to let the whole of the army reach its intended objectives.

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This was well understood by the German supply units even before the operation, but their warnings were disregarded. The entire German planning was based on the premise that within five weeks the German troops would have attained full strategic freedom due to a complete collapse of the Red Army. Only then would it have been possible to divert necessary logistic support to the fuel requirements of the few mobile units needed to occupy the defeated state.

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German infantry and tanks stormed 300 miles ahead in the first week, but their supply lines struggled to keep up. Russian railroads could at first not be used due to a difference in railway gauge, until a sufficient supply of trains was seized. The convoys of slow-moving vehicles and railroad tracks were also favorite targets of Soviet partisans, although partisan activity was still low in 1941. Lack of supplies significantly slowed down the blitzkrieg.

Related Topics:
Railway gauge - Soviet partisans - Blitzkrieg

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Weather

Probably no other factor has been as misunderstood as the effect of the weather on the German invasion. Weather is a neutral factor in warfare. The side that is best prepared to use weather conditions will gain advantage; the side that ignores it will suffer accordingly. The underestimated strength of the Soviet Army brought about the peril of unfavourable weather.

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The German forces were not prepared to deal with harsh weather and the poor road network of the USSR. In autumn, the terrain slowed the Wehrmacht?s progress. Few roads were paved. The ground in the USSR was either a very loose sand in the summer, a sticky muck in the fall, or heavy snow during the winter. The German tanks had narrow treads that gave little traction and poor floatation in the mud. In contrast, the new generation of Soviet tanks such as the T-34 and KV were far more mobile. The 600,000 large western European horses the Germans used for supply and artillery movement did not cope well with this weather. The small ponies used by the Red Army were better adapted to this climate.

Related Topics:
T-34 - KV

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German troops were mostly unprepared for the harsh weather changes in autmumn and winter 1941. Equipment had been prepared for such winter conditions, but the ability to move it up front over the severely overstrained transport network did not exist. Consequently, the troops were not equipped with adequate cold-weather gear, and some soldiers had to pack newspapers into their jackets to stay warm while temperatures dropped to record levels of at least -30 C. To operate furnaces and heaters, the Germans also burned precious fuel that was difficult to re-supply. Soviet soldiers often had warm, quilted uniforms, felt-lined boots, and fur hats.

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Some German weapons also malfunctioned in the cold. Lubricating oils were unsuitable for extreme cold weather, with the result that engines malfunctioned and automatic weapons would not fire. To load shells into a tank?s main gun, frozen grease had to be chipped off with a knife. Soviet units faced less severe problems due to their experience with cold weather. Aircraft were supplied with insulating blankets to keep their engines warm while parked. Lighter-weight oil was used.

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A common myth has it that the combination of deep mud, followed by snow, stopped all military movement in the harsh Russian winter. In fact military operations were slowed by these factors, but much more so on the German side than on the Soviet side. The same snow fell on Soviet soldiers as well as Germans. The Soviet December 1941 counteroffensive advanced up to 100 miles in some sectors, demonstrating that mobile warfare was still possible under winter conditions.

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