Non-Aristotelian logic

The term non-Aristotelian logic, sometimes shortened to null-A, is a term popularised by A. E. van Vogt and deriving from Alfred Korzybski's General Semantics. Proponents of General Semantics take as meaning any non-classical system of logic which uses three or more truth values. They argue that this renders relatively 'subjective' conclusions from inductive logic, rather than relying strictly on the binary, deductive reasoning widely accepted as yielding more 'objective' results and capable of providing 'scientific proof'. It is argued that the null-A concept is complementary to Aristotle's system of two-valued, true/false logic, i.e., "A is either B, or it is not B."

Related Topics:
A. E. van Vogt - Alfred Korzybski - General Semantics - Binary

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This position, it must be said, is largely driven by General Semanticist ideology. The majority of polyvalent logics (e.g. Relevant logic, the Continuum logic and the Kleene 3-logic) make no claim to replace deductive reasoning, but are generally extensions of classical logic intended to deal with specific issues (e.g. the paradoxes of material implication, theories of truth) and are strictly axiomatic, making them rigorously deductive.

Related Topics:
Relevant logic - Continuum logic - Kleene - Truth

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Alternative terms in common academic usage include deviant logic and Multi-valued logic (see Haack, 'Philosophy of Logic', 1980). Not all non-classical logics fall into this class, e.g. Modal logic is a non-classical logic which, however, has only two truth values.

Related Topics:
Deviant logic - Multi-valued logic - Modal logic

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