Napoleon's Invasion of Russia

The invasion of the Russian Empire led by Napoleon I of France in 1812 was a critical turning point in the Napoleonic wars. The campaign reduced the French and allied invasion forces to less than two percent of their initial strength. Its sustained role in Russian culture may be seen in Tolstoy's War and Peace and the Soviet identification between it and the German invasion of 1941-1945.

The Invasion

The Opposing Armies

In June 1812, Napoleon's Grande Armée of 691,500 men, the largest army assembled up to that point in European history, crossed the river Neman and headed towards Moscow.

Related Topics:
Grande Armée - Neman - Moscow

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The Grande Armée was divided as follows:

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• A central strike force of 250,000 under the emperor's personal command.
• Two other frontline armies under Eugène de Beauharnais (80,000 men) and Jérôme Bonaparte (70,000 men).
• Two detached corps under Jacques Macdonald (32,500 men) and Karl Schwarzenberg (34,000 Austrian troops).
• A reserve army of 225,000 troops.

In addition 80,000 National Guards had been conscripted for full military service defending the imperial frontier of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. With these included total French imperial forces on the Russian border and in Russia came to some 771,500 men. This vast commitment of manpower severely strained the Empire - especially considering that there were a further 300,000 French troops fighting in Iberia and over 200,000 more in Germany and Italy.

Related Topics:
Iberia - Germany - Italy

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450,000 French troops made up the majority of the army with French allies making up the rest. In addition to the dettached Austrian corps under Schwarzenberg there were some 95,000 Poles, 90,000 Germans (24,000 Bavarians, 20,000 Saxons, 20,000 Prussians, 17,000 Westphalians and several thousand from smaller Rhineland states), 25,000 Italians, 12,000 Swiss, 4,800 Spaniards, 3,500 Croats and 2,000 Portuguese. In addition there were Dutch and Belgian contingents. In short every nationality in Napoleon's vast empire was represented.

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According to most modern estimates, the Russian army numbered less than the French initially. Some 280,000 Russian troops were deployed to the Polish frontier (in preparation for Tsar Alexander I's planned invasion of the French satellite, the Grand Duchy of Warsaw). Total Russian armies numbered about 500,000 (some estimates place the number as low as 350,000, while others go anywhere up to 710,000 - probably a figure in the vicinity of 400,000 is more accurate) on the eve of war. These were divided into three main armies - the First Army of the West (commanded by General Mikhail Barclay de Tolly) of some 159,800 men, the Second Army of the West (commanded by General Pyotr Bagration) numbering 62,000, and the Third Army of the West (commanded by General Tormasov) numbering about 58,200. Two reserve forces, one of 65,000 and one of 47,000 supported these three frontline armies. Going by these figures total Russian armies immediately facing Napoleon numbered some 392,000. In addition, peace had been secured for St Petersburg with Sweden and the Ottoman Empire - freeing up over 100,000 more troops. Efforts were made to swell Russian armies and by September troop numbers had been expanded to around 900,000 - not including irregular cossack units, which probably add a further 70,000 or 80,000 men to the total.

Related Topics:
Alexander I - Mikhail Barclay de Tolly - Pyotr Bagration - St Petersburg - Sweden - Ottoman Empire

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The March on Moscow

The invasion commenced on June 23, 1812. Napoleon had sent a final offer of peace to Saint Petersburg shortly before commencing operations. He never received a reply, so he gave the order to proceed into Russian Poland. He met little or no resistance initially and moved quickly into the enemy's territory. The Russians offered only sporadic resistance and Barclay, the commander-in-chief refused to fight, despite Bagration's urgings, for he knew he could not defeat the French army in a pitched battle. Several times he attempted to establish a strong defensive position, but each time the French advance was too quick for him to finish preparations and he was forced to retreat once more. This has often mistakenly been used as an example of the scorched earth policy - in reality the Russian retreat was not part of any master plan to lure the French into the depths of Russia where the winter and lack of adequate provisions would combine to destroy them, but rather the result of Russian commanders being denied an opportunity to give battle in favourable circumstances by the speed and strength of the French advance.

Related Topics:
June 23 - Scorched earth

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Political pressure on Barclay to give battle and the general's continuing resistance (viewed as intransigence by the populace) led to his removal from the position of commander-in-chief to be replaced by the boastful and popular Kutuzov. Despite Kutuzov's rhetoric to the contrary, he continued in much the way Barclay had, immediately seeing that to face the French in open battle would be to sacrifice his army pointlessly. Finally he managed to establish a defensive position at Borodino (following an indecisive clash at Smolensk (August 16-18)). The Battle of Borodino on September 7 was the bloodiest single day of battle in human history (see the article on the battle for more details) and was a French victory. The Russian army could only muster half of its strength on September 8 and was forced to retreat, leaving the road to Moscow open. Kutuzov also ordered the evacuation of the city.

Related Topics:
Smolensk - August 16 - 18 - Battle of Borodino - September 7 - September 8

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By this point the Russians had managed to draft large numbers of reinforcements into the army bringing total Russian land forces to their peak strength in 1812 of 904,000 with perhaps 100,000 in the immediate vicinity of Moscow - the remnants of Kutuzov's shattered army from Borodino partially reinforced. The ability of the Russians to so quickly replenish their numbers was the critical advantage that would bring them ultimate victory by the end of the campaign.

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The Capture of Moscow

Napoleon moved into an empty city that was stripped of all supplies by the governor, Rastopchin. Relying on classical rules of warfare aiming at capturing the enemy's capital (even though St. Petersburg had been the actual capital at that time), he had expected tsar Alexander I to offer his capitulation at the Poklonnaya Hill, but Russian command did not surrender. Instead, fires broke out in Moscow, and raged in the city from 14 to 18 September New Style (2 to 6 September Old Style). Moscow, constructed mainly of wooden buildings, burnt down almost completely, effectively depriving the French of shelter in the city. It is assumed that the fires were due to Russian sabotage.

Related Topics:
Tsar - Alexander I - Poklonnaya Hill - New Style - Old Style - Sabotage

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Napoleon would later remark that had he moved out of Moscow a fortnight earlier than he did, he could have destroyed Kutuzov's army encamped at nearby Tarutino. While this would have by no means left Russia defenseless, it would have deprived it of its only concentrated army capable of challenging the French. Perhaps had this happened Alexander may have surrendered. We shall never know.

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Retreat

Sitting in the ashes of a ruined city without having received the Russian capitulation, and facing a Russian maneuver forcing him out of Moscow, Napoleon started his long retreat. At the Battle of Maloyaroslavets, Kutuzov was able to force the French army into using the very same scorched Smolensk road on which they had earlier moved East; continuing to block the southern flank to prevent the French from returning by a different route, Kutuzov again deployed partisan tactics to constantly strike at the French trail where it was weakest. Light Russian cavalry, including mounted Cossacks, assaulted and shattered isolated French units. Supply of the army grew increasingly difficult, and the desertion rate increased. Starting in November 1812, the Russian winter caused additional hardship to the French army, as soldiers and horses started to die from hunger, frostbite and exhaustion on the march. The crossing of the river Berezina brought about another major defeat, as Kutuzov, deciding that the time was right for an open battle, attacked and crushed the part of the French army that had not yet made it across the bridge. In the following weeks, the remnants of the Grand Army were further diminished, and on December 14 1812 they were expelled from Russian territory. Only about 22,000 of Napoleon's men survived the Russian campaign. Russian casualties in the few open battles are comparable to the French losses, but civilian losses along the devastated war path were much higher than the military casualties. In total, despite earlier estimates giving figures of several million dead, around one million were killed - fairly evenly split between the French and Russians. Military losses amounted to 300,000 French, 70,000 Poles, 50,000 Italians, 80,000 Germans and perhaps 450,000 Russians. As well as the loss of human life the French also lost some 200,000 horses and over 1,000 artillery pieces.

Related Topics:
Battle of Maloyaroslavets - Partisan - Cossacks - Berezina - December 14 - 1812

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