Moral relativism

In philosophy, Moral relativism is the position that moral or ethical propositions do not reflect absolute or universal truths but instead are relative to social, cultural, historical or personal references, and that there is no single standard by which to assess an ethical proposition's truth. Relativistic positions often see moral values as applicable only within certain cultural boundaries or the context of individual preferences. An extreme relativist position might suggest that it is meaningless for the moral or ethical judgments or acts of one person or group to be judged by another, though most relativists propound a more limited version of the theory.

Some philosophical considerations

So-called descriptive relativists (for example, Ralph Barton Perry), accept that there are fundamental disagreements about the right course of action even when the same facts obtain and the same consequences are likely to arise. However, the descriptive relativist does not necessarily deny that there is one correct moral appraisal, given the same set of circumstances. Other descriptivists believe that opposing moral beliefs can both be true, though critics point out that this leads to obvious logical problems. The latter descriptivists, for example, several leading Existentialists, believe that morality is entirely subjective and personal, and beyond the judgment of others. In this view, moral judgments are more akin to aesthetic considerations and are not amenable to rational analysis.

Related Topics:
Ralph Barton Perry - Existentialists

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In contrast, the metaethical relativist maintains that all moral judgments are based on either societal or individual standards, and that there is no single, objective standard by which one can assess the truth of a moral proposition. While he preferred to deal with more practical, real-life ethical matters, the British philosopher Bernard Williams (1929-2003) reluctantly came to this conclusion when he put on his metaethicist's hat. Metaethical relativists, in general, believe that the descriptive properties of terms such as good, bad, right, and wrong are not subject to universal truth conditions, but only to societal convention and personal preference. Given the same set of verifiable facts, some societies or individuals will have a fundamental disagreement about what ought to be done based on societal or individiual norms, and these cannot be adjudicated using some independent standard of evaluation, for the latter standard will always be societal or personal and not universal, unlike, for example, the scientific standards for assessing temperature or for determining mathematical truths.

Related Topics:
Bernard Williams - Universal - Truth

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Moral relativism stands in marked contrast to moral absolutism, moral realism, and moral naturalism, which all maintain that there are moral facts, facts that can be both known and judged, whether through some process of verification or through intuition. These philosophies see morality as something that obtains in the world. Examples include the philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), who saw man's nature as inherently good, or of Ayn Rand, who believed morality is derived from man's exercising his unobstructed rationality. Others believe moral knowledge is something that can be derived by external sources such as a deity or revealed doctrines, as would be maintained by various religions. Some hold that moral facts inhere in nature or reality, either as particular instances of perfect ideas in an eternal realm, as adumbrated by Plato (429-347 BC); or as a simple, unanalyzable property, as advocated by Moore. In each case, however, moral facts are invariant, though the circumstances to which they apply might be different. Moreover, in each case, moral facts are objective and can be determined.

Related Topics:
Moral absolutism - Moral realism - Moral naturalism - Jean-Jacques Rousseau - Ayn Rand - Religion - Plato

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Some philosophers maintain that moral relativism devolves into emotivism, the movement inspired by logical positivists in the early part of the 20th Century. Leading exponents of logical positivism include Rudolph Carnap {1891-1970} and A. J. Ayer {1910-1989}. Going beyond Hume, the positivists contended that a proposition is meaningful only if it can be verified by logical or scientific inquiry. Thus, metaphysical propositions, which cannot be verified in this manner, are not simply incorrect, they are meaningless, nonsensical. Moral judgments are primarily expressions of emotional preferences or states, devoid of cognitive content; consequently, they are not subject to verification. As such, moral propositions are essentially meaningless utterances or, at best, express personal attitudes (see, for example, Charles L. Stevenson {1908-1979}). Not all relativists would hold that moral propositions are meaningless; indeed, many make any number of assertions about morality, assertions that they undoubtedly believe to be meaningful. However, other philosophers have argued that, since we have no means of analysing a moral proposition, it is essentially meaningless, and, in their view, relativism is therefore tantamount to emotivism.

Related Topics:
Emotivism - Logical positivists - Rudolph Carnap - A. J. Ayer - Logic - Metaphysical - Charles L. Stevenson

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Political theorist Leo Strauss (1899-1973), subscribed to a species of relativism, believing that there do not exist objective criteria for assessing ethical principles, and that a rational morality is only possible in the limited sense that one must accept its ultimate subjectivity. This view is very similar to the one advocated by existentialist philosophers Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) and Sartre. The latter famously maintained that ethical principles only arise from our personal feelings at the time we act, and not from any antecedent principles.

Related Topics:
Leo Strauss - Martin Heidegger

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The thought of Karl Marx (1818-1883), proposes a type of moral relativist, asserting that each moral system was simply a product of the dominant socio-economic class, and that the movement of history will settle moral questions, in contrast to moral absolutist or universalist positions.

Related Topics:
Karl Marx - Class

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