Moral relativism

In philosophy, Moral relativism is the position that moral or ethical propositions do not reflect absolute or universal truths but instead are relative to social, cultural, historical or personal references, and that there is no single standard by which to assess an ethical proposition's truth. Relativistic positions often see moral values as applicable only within certain cultural boundaries or the context of individual preferences. An extreme relativist position might suggest that it is meaningless for the moral or ethical judgments or acts of one person or group to be judged by another, though most relativists propound a more limited version of the theory.

Critics of relativism

Those who support positions of moral absolutism or universalism are often highly critical of moral relativism; some have been known to equate it with outright "immorality" or amorality. Various historical and cultural events and practices, including The Holocaust, Stalinism and communist atrocities of the 20th century, Apartheid in South Africa, genocide, unjust wars, genital mutilation, slavery, terrorism, Nazism, etc., present difficult problems for relativists. An observer in a particular time and place, depending on his outlook (e.g., culture, religion, background), might call something good that another observer in a particular time and place would call evil. Slavery, for example, was thought by many to be acceptable, even good, in other times and places, while it is viewed by many (though certainly not all), today, as a great evil. Many writers and thinkers have held that any number of evils can be justified based on subjective or cultural preferences, and that morality requires some universal standard against which to measure ethical judgments.

Related Topics:
The Holocaust - Stalinism - 20th century - Apartheid - Genocide - Unjust war - Genital mutilation - Slavery - Terrorism - Nazism

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Some relativists will state that this is an unfair criticism of relativism, for it is really a descriptive, or meta-ethical, theory, and not a normative one, and that relativists may have strong moral beliefs, notwithstanding their foundational position. Critics of this view, however, argue it is disingenuous, and that the relativist is not making a mere meta-ethical observation. These critics contend that stating there is no preferred standard of truth, or that standards are equally true, addresses the ultimate validity and truth of the ethical judgments themselves, which, they contend, is a normative judgment. In other words, the separation between meta-ethics and normative ethics is arguably a distinction without a difference.

Related Topics:
Descriptive - Meta-ethical - Normative

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Some philosophers, for example, Michael E. Berumen (b. 1952) and R. M. Hare (1919-2002), argue that moral propositions are subject to logical rules, notwithstanding the absence of any factual content, including those subject to cultural or religious standards or norms. Thus, for example, they contend that one cannot hold contradictory ethical judgments. This allows for moral discourse with shared standards, notwithstanding the descriptive properties or truth conditions of moral terms. They do not affirm or deny there are moral facts, only that logic applies to our moral assertions; consequently, they contend, there is an objective and preferred standard of moral justification, albeit in a very limited sense. These philosophers also point out that, aside from logical constraints, all systems treat certain moral terms alike in an evaluative sense. This is similar to our treatment of other terms such as less or more, the meaning of which is universally understood and not dependent upon independent standards (measurements, for example, can be converted). It applies to good and bad when used in their non-moral sense, too: for example, when we say, "this is a good wrench" or "this is a bad wheel." This evaluative property of certain terms also allows people of different beliefs to have meaningful discussions on moral questions, even though they disagree about certain facts.

Related Topics:
Michael E. Berumen - R. M. Hare - 1919 - 2002

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Berumen, among others, has said that if relativism were wholly true, there would be no reason to prefer it over any other theory, given its fundamental contention that there is no preferred standard of truth. He says that it is not simply a metaethical theory, but a normative one, and that its truth, by its own definition, cannot in the final analysis be assessed or weighed against other theories.

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