Moral realism

Moral realism is the view in philosophy that there are suitably mind-independent and therefore objective moral facts that moral judgments are in the business of describing. This combines a cognitivist view about moral judgments (they are belief-like mental states in the business of describing the way the world is), a view about the existence of moral facts (they do in fact exist), and a view about the nature of moral facts (they are objective: independent of our cognizing them, or our stance towards them, etc.). It contrasts with expressivist or fictionalist theories of moral judgment (e.g., Stevenson, Hare, Blackburn, Gibbard, Kalderon), irrealist denials of the existence of moral facts (e.g., Mackie, Joyce, and the expressivists), and constructivist or relativist theories of the nature of moral facts (e.g., Firth, Rawls, Korsgaard, Harman). Some moral realists include David Brink, John McDowell, Peter Railton, Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Michael Smith, and Thomas Nagel.

Related Topics:
Philosophy - Mind-independent - Objective - Cognitivist - Expressivist - Fictionalist - Stevenson - Hare - Blackburn - Gibbard - Kalderon - Mackie - Joyce - Relativist - Firth - Rawls - Korsgaard - Harman - David Brink - John McDowell - Peter Railton - Geoffrey Sayre-McCord - Michael Smith - Thomas Nagel

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