Frontiero v. Richardson

Frontiero v. Richardson, {{ussc|411|677|1973}}, was an Equal Protection case in which the Supreme Court decided that benefits given by the United States military to the family of service members cannot be given out differently because of gender.

Related Topics:
Equal Protection - Supreme Court - United States military - Gender

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Sharron Frontiero, a lieutenant in the United States Air Force, applied for housing and medical benefits for her husband, Joseph, whom she claimed as a "dependent." While servicemen could claim their wives as dependents and get benefits for them automatically, servicewomen had to prove that their husbands were dependent on them for more than half their support. Joseph did not qualify under this rule, and therefore could not get benefits. Sharron sued, and the case was appealed up to the Supreme Court. Future Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg argued the case before the court on behalf of Frontiero.

Related Topics:
Lieutenant - United States Air Force - Ruth Bader Ginsburg

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A plurality of the Court (Justices Douglas, White, Marshall and Brennan, who wrote the plurality's opinion) found the military's benefit policy unconstitutional, because there was no reason why military wives needed benefits any more than similarly situated military husbands. The Air Force argued that the policy was intended to save administrative costs by not forcing the military bureaucracy to determine that every wife was in fact a dependent. Justice Brennan dismissed this argument, saying that, although as an empirical matter more wives than husbands are dependent for support on their spouses, still, by automatically granting benefits to wives who might not truly be dependents, the Air Force might be actually be losing money because of this policy—and the Air Force had not presented evidence to the contrary.

Related Topics:
Plurality - Justices - Douglas - White - Marshall - Brennan - Bureaucracy

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More importantly, the plurality argued for a strict standard of judicial scrutiny for those laws and regulations that classified on the basis of sex, instead of mere rational-basis review. (See the appropriate section of the Equal Protection Clause article for more information on the different levels of Equal Protection scrutiny.) A heightened standard of review, the plurality argued, was needed due to America's "long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination":

Related Topics:
Section - America's

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he sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society. As a result, statutory distinctions between the sexes often have the effect of invidiously relegating the entire class of females to inferior legal status without regard to the actual capabilities of its individual members.

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The plurality's application of "strict scrutiny" was was not adopted in subsequent cases for evaluating gender discrimination claims; instead, so-called "intermediate scrutiny" was adopted in Craig v. Boren (1976).

Related Topics:
Craig v. Boren - 1976

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Justices Stewart, Blackmun and Powell, and Chief Justice Burger concurred in the result, but did not think the time was right to declare a heightened standard of review for sex classifications, as the nation was then engaged in a debate over the Equal Rights Amendment. Justice Rehnquist dissented.

Related Topics:
Stewart - Blackmun - Powell - Chief Justice - Burger - Equal Rights Amendment - Rehnquist

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