French presidential election, 1981

As one quickly comes to realize in the study of politics, the "rules of the game," the institutional design can determine the fate of the players in the game. This could be no truer than in the French political system. Surrounding the French presidential election of 1981 was an absolutely extraordinary set of circumstances that moved the France into a new phase of politics. From these circumstantial anomalies emerged the first Socialist president of the Fifth Republic; indeed, the election of Socialist François Mitterrand marked the first administration change in the Fifth Republic.

Giscard d'Estaing's government

The most important set of circumstances that gave Mitterrand the advantage over Giscard was Giscard?s incumbency itself. Usually, being an incumbent is an advantage. This was not the case, however, during the 1981 French elections. The incumbent seemed to have been cursed with many political misfortunes during his Presidential term; these crippling situations included internal things that he could have controlled (and chose to ignore), and external forces that were beyond the incumbent?s control.

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Centralisation

The internal political shortcomings seemed to have done Giscard as much harm (if not more harm) than the external factors that attributed to his electoral loss. Giscard, a pragmatic leader, had an haughty and disparaging personality. The characteristic of Giscard led him to be very inaccessible not only to the French people themselves (who were beginning to tire after twenty-three years of Rightist administration besides), but led him to be inaccessible to the other cabinet members whose support he needed to reinforce his political legitimacy. His condescending and disparaging perspective led him to conclude that others involved in the political machine were inept and ill-suited to correctly implement his important policy decisions.

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With this view, Giscard took over the most minute details in his policy-making, leaving his Prime Minister Jacques Chirac, his ministers, and several layers of civil servants without duties and ultimately without any power. Each of these different groups within the administration thrives on the implementation of policy. Most of the cabinet was effectively ignored, and none of the ministers felt that they had a say in the direction that Giscard was taking France. The position of Prime Minister, the one most affected by Giscard?s dictatorial style of policy-making, is a position that derives power and legitimacy from the authority to implement policy. Without this duty to be performed, the Prime Minister is merely a figurehead without participation in either the executive or the legislative functions of the government. Giscard?s removal of power from his Prime Minister was one of the factors that led Chirac to run in the election of 1981, a decision that would ultimately determine the fate of the 1981 election.

Related Topics:
Prime Minister - Jacques Chirac - Ministers - Civil servant - Cabinet

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Another group of the administration, the bureaucracy, the civil servants also had their function greatly reduced. When studying French politics it is difficult to miss the importance of the civil servants in the political system. There is a sense of pride and significance derived from the coveted positions in French civil service. Indeed, efficient, effective, and loyal civil service can lead to ministerial positions and other political leadership positions within the system. Without a task to be effective, efficient, and loyal at, however, there was no vehicle for the civil servants to prove their abilities. Under Giscard, the civil servants were effectively robbed of this pride and felt like a bureaucratic "stamp brigade."

Related Topics:
French politics - French civil service

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Policies

Even with Giscard?s obsessive control over policy implementation, another internal political shortcoming of the incumbent Giscard appeared to be his ineffective tactics for deciding policy strategy. To the public, at least, Giscard?s policies seemed to be sporadic, hasty, and ill-timed reforms. These reforms were unpopular with the Right because they were too left-wing and involved more government involvement. They were also unpopular with the Left because they had several serious economic repercussions. However, many of the other platform issues that Giscard had run on in his previous election had been abandoned during creation of the administration?s agenda. These policies were major reform issues, not petty hot-button, item-of-the-day issues; they were conspicuous (if not overly ambitious) pledges that were never quite undertaken during his presidency.

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A poll taken June 1980 showed that, besides the Rightists, even people on the Left (15% of Socialists and 13% of Communists) had liked and endorsed Giscard previously because of his reformist attitude. By April 1981, however, this endorsement had dropped radically on the Left (7% and 1% of Socialists and Communists respectively), and had not risen dramatically on the Right. But as the election wore on, and Chirac joined the race, Giscard had to appeal to his Rightist constituency and drop most of these radical views. As a result, his popularity fell and he was thought of as an opportunist. He had promised to be open to the opposition in Parliament, but the opposite had occurred, in fact. Because of his personality and his control over policy implementation, the executive powers had become highly centralized; control was concentrated in the hands of Giscard and his cabinet composed of a few trusted friends?namely, Michel Poniatowski, a "faithful friend and advisor".

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