British 11th Army Group

The British 11th Army Group was the main British Army force in Southeast Asia. It was activated in November 1943 upon the formation of South East Asia Command (SEAC). Its commander was General George Giffard, who had formerly been Commander-in-Chief West Africa Command and Commander, Indian Eastern Army. Its headquarters was situated in New Dehli, eventually moving to Ceylon.

Related Topics:
British - British Army - Southeast Asia - South East Asia Command - General - George Giffard - West Africa Command - Indian Eastern Army - Ceylon

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Its main subordinate formations were Fourteenth Army and the Ceylon Army. It would have been logical for 11th Army Group to have the Northern Combat Area Command under its control as well, so that the whole front in Burma would have been under a single commander, but General Joseph Stilwell the NCAC operational commander, (who was also Deputy Supreme Commander South East Asia and therefore Giffard's superior) refused to serve under Giffard's command.

Related Topics:
Fourteenth Army - Ceylon Army - Northern Combat Area Command - Joseph Stilwell

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During the advance to be made in Northern combat area from Ledo to Myitkyina to cover the building of the Ledo Road, it was essential that this attack was co-ordinated with the attacks further south to prevent the Japanese concentrating large numbers of reserves for a counter attack on any one front. The initial idea was that as General Stilwell would be commanding several Chinese divisions which would attack out of India from the West and had loose control over the large but amorphous Yunnan armies attacking out of China from the East, he would be commanding a large army. So his command should be placed under 11th Army Group at the same level as the Fourteenth. The attacks could then be co-ordinated at Army Group level.

Related Topics:
Ledo - Myitkyina - Ledo Road

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: Stilwell, however bitterly resisted it,...To watch Stilwell, when hard pressed, shift his opposition from one of the several strong-points he held by virtue of his numerous Allied, American and Chinese offices, to another was a lesson in mobile offensive-defence.{{ref|bitterly}}

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In a meeting to solve the problem of command, Stilwell, under intense pressure from the Supreme Allied Commander of SEAC Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten astonished everyone by saying "I am prepared to come under General Slim's operational control until I get to Kamaing"{{ref|slim}}. Rather than sack him, Mountbatten reluctantly agreed to this, but it was a dangerous compromise. It created a complicated chain of command where Slim theoretically had to report to two different commanders. Giffard for Fourteenth Army actions and Mountbatten for Stilwell's formations. Under a general less gifted than Slim this could have caused serious problems if Slim had not been able to command Stilwell at an operational level with out disagreement (which given Vinegar Joe's proven track record was more than likely). But at an operational level Slim was able to work with Stilwell and "this illogical command set-up worked surprisingly well".{{ref|illogical}}

Related Topics:
Louis Mountbatten - Slim - Kamaing

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