Battle of Rossbach

battle_name=Battle of Rossbach

Opening Moves

The Allies (about 42,000 men) possessed a numerical superiority of two to one in the battle itself, irrespective of detachments, and their advanced post overlooked all parts of Frederick's camp. They had had the best of it in the manoeuvres of the previous days, and the duke of Hildburghausen determined to take the offensive. He had some difficulty, however, in inducing Soubise to risk a battle, and the Allies did not begin to move off their camping-ground until after eleven on the 5th, Soubise probably having the intention to engage as late in the day as possible, with the idea of gaining what advantages he could in a partial action. The plan called for the Allied army to march by Zeuchfeld, round Frederick's left (which no serious natural obstacle covered), and to deploy in battle array, facing north, between Reichardtswerben (right) and Pettstädt (left). The duke's proposed battle and the more limited aim of Soubise appeared equally likely to succeed in taking this position, which threatened to cut off Frederick

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from the towns on the Saale. But the Allies could only attain this position by marching round the Prussian flank, i.e. by a flank march before the enemy. The Allies posted a considerable flank guard against the obvious risk of interference on the exposed flank. Not the execution of their original design, but a hasty modification of it to suit unfounded assumptions caused the Allies to meet with disaster.

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Frederick spent the morning watching them from a house-top in Rossbach. The initial stages of their movement convinced him that the Allies had started retreating southward towards their magazines, and about noon he went to dinner, leaving Captain von Gaudi on the watch. This officer formed a different impression of the Allies' intentions, for the columns which from time to time became visible in the undulations of the ground appeared to turn eastwards from Zeuchfeld. Gaudi's excited report at first served only to confirm Frederick in his error. But when the king saw for himself that hostile cavalry and infantry had already approached near to Pettstädt, he realized the enemy's intentions. The Allies now offered him the battle for which he had manoeuvred in vain, and he took it without hesitation.

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