Battle of Jutland

The Battle of Jutland, known in Germany as the Battle of the Skagerrak (Skagerrakschlacht), was the largest naval battle of World War I, and the only full-scale clash of battleships in that war. It was fought on 31 May–1 June 1916, in the North Sea near Jutland, the mainland of Denmark. The combatants were the Kaiserliche Marine's High Seas Fleet, commanded by Vice Admiral Reinhard Scheer, and the Royal Navy's Grand Fleet, commanded by Admiral Sir John Jellicoe.

Battle damage assessment

The British lost fourteen ships including several battlecruisers totalling 111,000 tons and 6,094 men. The Germans lost eleven ships of 62,000 tons total and 2,551 men. Several other ships were badly damaged, such as HMS Lion and SMS Seydlitz. At the end of the battle the British had twenty-four dreadnoughts and battlecruisers still able and ready to fight while the Germans had only ten.

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For the British, the outcome was a marginal tactical gain. Although they had lost several ships and had not destroyed the German fleet as intended, the Germans had retreated to port and the British were in command of the area. At a strategic level the outcome was more clear cut. The damaged British ships were restored to operational use quicker than the Germans and the High Seas Fleet did not leave port again. It remained active and a fighting force, however, and its presence as a fleet in being prevented a complete blockade of Germany.

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British examination of their performance identified two main problems:

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• Their armour-piercing shells exploded outside the German armour rather than penetrating and exploding within. As a result some German ships with only 8 inch (203 mm) of armour survived hits from 15 inch (381 mm) shells. Had these shells performed to design, coupled with the British accuracy of fire, German losses would probably have been greater.
• Communication between ships and the British commander in chief were poor. For most of the Battle Jellicoe had no idea where the German ships were, even though British ships were in contact. They failed to report positions contrary to the Grand Fleet Battle Plan. Some of the signalling was carried out by flag instead of wireless — a questionable procedure given the mixture of haze and smoke that obscured the battlefield.

Battlecruiser design and handling

The weak design and faulty use of the battlecruisers were important in the serious losses of the British. The battle is often regarded as demonstrating that the Royal Navy was technologically and operationally inferior to the German Navy. Jellicoe wrote in his despatch:

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:"The disturbing feature of the battle-cruiser action is the fact that five German battle-cruisers engaging six British vessels of this class, supported after the first twenty minutes, although at great range, by the fire of four battleships of the "Queen Elizabeth" class, were yet able to sink Queen Mary and Indefatigable ? The facts which contributed to the British losses were, first, the indifferent armour protection of our battle-cruisers, particularly as regards turret armour and deck plating, and, second, the disadvantage under which our vessels laboured in regard to the light ? The German organisation at night is very good. Their system of recognition signals is excellent. Ours is practically nil. Their searchlights are superior to ours and they use them with great effect. Finally, their method of firing at night gives excellent results. I am reluctantly compelled to the opinion that under night conditions we have a good deal to learn from them".

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During the summer of 2003, a diving expedition examined the wrecks of Invincible, Queen Mary, Defence, and Lützow to investigate the cause of the British ships' tendency to suffer from internal explosions. On this evidence, a major part of the blame may be laid on lax handling of the cordite propellant for the shells of the main guns. This, in turn, was a product of current British naval doctrine, which emphasised a rapid rate of fire in the direction of the enemy rather than slower, more accurate fire. In practice, the cordite could not be supplied to the guns rapidly enough through the hoists and hatches; in order to bring up the propellant for the next broadside before the time when it had to be loaded, many safety doors which should have been kept shut to safeguard against flash fires were open. Furthermore, whereas German cordite was supplied in brass cylinders, British cordite was supplied in silk bags, making it more susceptible to flash fires. The doctrine of a high rate of fire also led to the decision in 1913 to increase the supply of shells and cordite held on the British ships by 50 per cent, for fear of running out of ammunition; when this caused the capacity of the ships' magazines to be exceeded, cordite was stored in insecure places.

Related Topics:
2003 - Cordite

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The memoirs of Alexander Grant, gunner on Lion, show that some British officers were well aware of the dangers of careless handling of cordite:

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:"With the introduction of cordite to replace powder for firing guns, regulations regarding the necessary precautions for handling explosives became unconsciously considerably relaxed, even I regret to say, to a dangerous degree throughout the Service. The gradual lapse in the regulations on board ship seemed to be due to two factors. First, cordite is a much safer explosive to handle than gun-powder. Second, but more important, the altered construction of the magazines on board led to a feeling of false security ? The iron or steel deck, the disappearance of the wood lining, the electric lights fitted inside, the steel doors, open because there was now no chute for passing cartridges out; all this gave officers and men a comparative easiness of mind regarding the precautions necessary with explosive material".

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After the battle the Admiralty produced a report critical of the cordite handling practices. By this time, however, Jellicoe had been promoted to First Sea Lord and Beatty to command of the Grand Fleet; the report, which indirectly placed part of the blame for the disaster on the fleet's officers, was suppressed.

Related Topics:
Admiralty - First Sea Lord

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The battle showed that the British concept and use of the battlecruiser was wholly flawed. The battlecruiser had been designed according to Jackie Fisher's dictum that "speed is armour". They were intended to be faster than battleships, with superior fire control, and able to pound enemy cruisers at ranges at which the enemy could not reply. But at Jutland they were not used in this fashion — and indeed, British fire control was not sufficiently developed to permit them to be so used — but instead closed recklessly with enemy battleships while lacking the armour to stand up to the pounding they received.

Related Topics:
Battlecruiser - Jackie Fisher - Fire control

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The Jellicoe controversy

At the time Jellicoe was criticised for his caution and for allowing Scheer to escape. Beatty in particular was convinced that Jellicoe had missed a tremendous opportunity to win another Trafalgar and annihilate the High Seas Fleet. Jellicoe's career stagnated; he was promoted away from active command to become First Sea Lord, while Beatty replaced him as commander of the British Grand Fleet.

Related Topics:
Trafalgar - First Sea Lord - British Grand Fleet

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The controversy raged within the navy for about a decade after the war. Criticism focused on Jellicoe's decision at 19:15. Scheer had ordered his cruisers and destroyers forward in a torpedo attack to cover the turning away of his battleships. Jellicoe chose to turn away to the southeast and so keep out of range of the torpedoes. If Jellicoe had instead turned to the west, could his ships have dodged the torpedoes and destroyed the German fleet? Supporters of Jellicoe, including the naval historian Julian Corbett, pointed out the folly of risking defeat in battle when you already have the command of the seas. (Corbett's volume of the official history of the war, Naval Operations, contains the extraordinary disclaimer, "Their Lordships find that some of the principles advocated in the book, especially the tendency to minimise the importance of seeking battle and forcing it to a conclusion, are directly in conflict with their views.")

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Whatever one thinks of the result, it is true that the pressure on Jellicoe was immense, and his caution is certainly understandable. The former First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, said of the battle that Jellicoe "was the only man who could have lost the war in an afternoon." The criticism of Jellicoe also fails to give enough credit to Scheer, who was determined to preserve his fleet by avoiding a decisive engagement and showed great skill in effecting his escape.

Related Topics:
First Lord of the Admiralty - Winston Churchill

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Beatty's actions

There is another school of thought that condemns the actions of Admiral Beatty for the failure of a complete British victory. Although undeniably a brave man, Beatty's encounter action with the German High Seas Fleet almost cost the British the battle. Most of the British losses in tonnage occurred in Beatty's squadron. The three capital ships the British lost that day were all under the command of Beatty. Beatty used his battle cruisers in a manner for which they were not designed. They had been anticipated for use as cruiser-destroyer, rather than for a direct attack on larger and better armored dreadnought battleships. A battlecruiser in a slugging match against a dreadnought battleship was at a decisive disadvantage.

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Additionally, Beatty's lack of control over the encounter action is often criticised. Beatty did not apparently appreciate the finer points of command and control over a naval engagement. Beatty was on-board the battlecruiser Lion and lost contact with his four dreadnought battleships. Having the battlecruisers attack the German High Seas Fleet without the cover of the Queen Elizabeth super-dreadnoughts was a grave blunder. It both exposed the weakly armored battlecruisers and split his forces. Beatty's political influence in England prevented more criticism than took place at the time. Jellicoe's orderly attack on the Germans saved the day, according to proponents of this school of thought, and most probably Beatty's life.

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