Battle of Britain

battle_name=Battle of Britain

Luftwaffe strategy

German strategy was influenced by pre-war theories on strategic bombing, such as those espoused by Giulio Douhet. This stressed the air assault, the weakness of air defence, and the effects of terror bombing on public morale. After the Spanish Civil War the emphasis of German air operations had shifted toward a more tactical force. In Poland and France, the Luftwaffe had operated jointly with the Army, creating the Blitzkrieg or "lightning war". However, in the Battle of Britain the Luftwaffe had to operate alone, not as support for an advancing Army but as a decisive weapon in its own right. There remained a strong belief in the power of strategic bombing and the battle was seen by Göring as an opportunity to prove what his air force could do.

Related Topics:
Giulio Douhet - Spanish Civil War - Blitzkrieg

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The Luftwaffe regrouped after the Battle of France into three Luftflotten (Air Fleets) on the UK's southern and northern flanks. Luftflotte 2, commanded by Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring was responsible for the bombing of southeast England and the London area. Luftflotte 3, commanded by Generalfeldmarschall Hugo Sperrle was responsible for the West Country, Midlands and northwest England. Luftflotte 5, commanded by Generaloberst Hans-Jürgen Stumpff from his headquarters in Norway, had responsibility for the north of England and Scotland. As the battle progressed, command responsibility shifted, with Luftflotte 3 taking more responsibility for the night Blitz while the main attack fell upon Luftflotte 2's shoulders. Late in the battle an Italian expeditionary force, the Corpo Aereo Italiano, briefly joined the fighting.

Related Topics:
Generalfeldmarschall - Albert Kesselring - Hugo Sperrle - West Country - Generaloberst - Hans-Jürgen Stumpff - Norway - Scotland - Italian

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Initial Luftwaffe estimates of the duration of the campaign was for four days to defeat the RAF's Fighter Command in southern England, followed by four weeks in which bombers and long-range fighters would mop up the rest of the country and destroy the UK's aircraft industry. The plan was to begin attacks on airfields near to the coast, gradually rolling subsequent attacks inland toward London and the ring of Sector airfields defending it.

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Broadly, the Luftwaffe kept to this scheme, but its commanders had differences of opinion on strategy. The commander of Luftflotte 3, Hugo Sperrle, wanted to eradicate the air defence infrastructure by bombing. His counterpart in Luftflotte 2, Albert Kesselring, demanded to attack London directly—either to bombard the British government into submission or draw RAF fighters up into a decisive battle. Göring did nothing to clarify strategy between his commanders, obsessed as he was with maintaining his own powerbase in the Luftwaffe and indulging his outdated beliefs on air fighting, which were later to lead to tactical and strategic errors.

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The Luftwaffe was ill-served by their lack of intelligence on the British defences. The German intelligence services were fractured, riven by rivalries and their overall performance was amateurish. By 1940 there were few or no German agents operating in the UK and a handful of bungled attempts to insert spies into the country were foiled. This meant that the Luftwaffe had almost no recent knowledge of the workings of the RAF's air defences: in particular of the crucial command and control system that had been built before the war. Even when good information existed, such as 5th Abteilung's November 1939 assessment of Fighter Command strengths and capabilities, it was ignored if it did not match perceived wisdom.

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For much of the battle the Luftwaffe operated 'blind', unaware of their enemy's true strengths, capabilities and deployments. Many times the leadership believed Fighter Command strength had collapsed, while raids against supposed fighter airfields fell instead on bomber or coastal defence installations. The results of bombing and air fighting were exaggerated, resulting in a Luftwaffe leadership that became increasingly disconnected from reality. This lack of leadership and solid intelligence meant that the Germans did not adopt any consistent strategy, even when the RAF had its back to the wall.

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