Artificial consciousness

Artificial consciousness (AC), also known as machine consciousness (MC) or synthetic consciousness, is a field related to Artificial intelligence whose aim is to produce a rigorous and objective definition of consciousness, in a mathematical sense, and build a theory toward implementating it in a model or a cognitive architecture.{{fn|1}}

Artificial consciousness beyond information processing

The debate about whether a machine could be conscious under any circumstances is usually described as the conflict between physicalism and dualism. Dualists believe that there is something non-physical about consciousness whilst physicalists hold that all things are physical.

Related Topics:
Physicalism - Dualism

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

Physicalists are not limited to those who hold that consciousness is a property of encoded information on carrier signals. Several indirect realist philosophers and scientists have proposed that, although information processing might deliver the content of consciousness, the state that is consciousness is due to some other physical phenomenon. The eminent neurologist Wilder Penfield was of this opinion and scientists such as Arthur Stanley Eddington, Roger Penrose, Hermann Weyl, Karl Pribram, and Henry Stapp amongst many others have also proposed that consciousness involves physical phenomena subtler than information processing. Even some of the most ardent supporters of consciousness in information processors such as Daniel Dennett suggest that some new, emergent, scientific theory may be required to account for consciousness.

Related Topics:
Wilder Penfield - Arthur Stanley Eddington - Roger Penrose - Hermann Weyl - Karl Pribram - Henry Stapp - Daniel Dennett

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

As was mentioned above, neither the ideas that involve direct perception nor those that involve models of the world in the brain seem to be compatible with current physical theory. It seems that new physical theory may be required and the possibility of dualism is not, as yet, ruled out.

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~