Armoured warfare

Armoured warfare in modern warfare is understood to be the use of armoured fighting vehicles as a central component of the methods of war.

Second World War

Modern armour warfare doctrine was developed and established during the run up to World War II.

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The fundamental key to warfare is the concentration of force at a particular point.

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Concentration of force permits the guarantee or near-guarantee of victory in a particular engagement. Correctly chosen and exploited, victory in a given engagement or a small number of engagements is often sufficient to win the battle.

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For example, visualize a straight defensive line composed of two infantry and two armoured divisions, deployed equally along the length of the line. A numerically equivalent attacker can win by concentrating his armour at one point (with his infantry holding the rest of the line), thus guaranteeing the forcing of the line, then passing through, turning the flank of the two halves of the defensive line and rolling them up.

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The defensive line could attempt to counter-attack, but it is not strong at any point and although the combined infantry/armour attack of the defenders is stronger than an infantry only attack, it is not very much stronger (since the divisions are spread out along the entire line) and it is in general much easier to defend than attack.

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A major aspect of all warfare is the simple formula that the combat power of a combat unit is the square of the number of members of that unit:

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• One tank has the combat power of one tank. (1² = 1)
• Four tanks have sixteen times the combat power of a single tank. (4² = 16)

Thus, concentrating two divisions into one point and attacking generates a far, far greater force than is achieved by spreading two divisions into a line and pushing forward on a broad front.

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Concentration of force requires mobility (to permit rapid concentration) and power (to be effective in combat once concentrated). The tank embodies these two properties and so is the primary weapon.

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Prior to World War II, horse mounted Cavalry performed what is now the tank role; breaking past and attacking the enemy in the rear. In all armies there was a great deal of resistance to the introduction of the tank (due to the concomitant replacement of the horse), in particular as Cavalry units were regarded as the elite and had a lot of influence within the army.

Related Topics:
Horse - Cavalry

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The German military in particular were about ten years ahead of everyone else in developing the theory, and adopting the practise, of armoured warfare, and this advantage enabled them to conquer most of Europe; their opponents were still using obsolete strategy and tactics and were entirely unable to meet and defeat the new paradigm practised by the German Army.

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Indeed, it was only towards the later years of the war, with the invasion of the European mainland, that the Allied Armies began to properly practise armoured warfare. In 1942 and 1943, the Allies consistently lost armoured battles in the North African desert due to improper tactics; in particular, running armoured formations into opposing anti-tank positions.

Related Topics:
1942 - 1943

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In the UK and in France, armour was accepted into the Army, but using a division of labour: some as infantry support weapons, others as cavalry replacements. As such, British and French infantry tanks were heavily armoured but as a consequence too slow, whereas British cavalry ("cruiser") tanks were swift and as a result poorly armoured. German tanks were designed for independent mobile operations and as all-around tanks: lighter, considerably more mobile but more weakly armed and armoured than the infantry tanks; tanks were not yet seen to be a primary anti-tank weapon. When the German tanks actually had to fight the British infantry tanks they were severely discomfited. At the start of the German invasion, the French possessed more tanks and, in one-to-one terms, better tanks, than the Germans; but what mattered was how the tanks were used, and the French distributed half of theirs amongst independent tank battalions for infantry support, rendering them impotent. The Germans in 1940 concentrated all their tanks into Panzer divisions and used them for a strategic envelopment, smashing their way through the French defensive line and onto The Channel.

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To counter such attacks, a mobile anti-tank forward must be held in reserve and moved to meet the attack. The French had no strategic reserve at all; let alone a highly mobile reserve, which was crucial in their failure to resist the German penetration.

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